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The United States taxes gifts made while an individual is liv-
ing more leniently than it taxes wealth transfers at death. Al-
though in some measure this disparity has existed since the enact-
ment of the modern estate and gift taxes in 19161 and 1932,2 it was
significantly narrowed by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (the 1976
Act).3 That statute replaced the separate gift and estate taxes with
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I Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, tit. II, 9§ 200-212, 39 Stat. 756, 777-80
(current version at I.R.C. §§ 2001-2057 (1982)).
2 Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, tit. 1Il, §9 501-532, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59
(current version at I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (1982)).
' Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2001(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1520,
1846-48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C. (1982)). Before 1976, lifetime
transfers subject to the gift tax, like transfers at death subject to the estate tax, were taxed
at steeply graduated rates. The gift tax rates, however, were applied independently of the
estate tax rates, so that, regardless of how much wealth an individual had transferred by
lifetime gift, the first dollar of his taxable estate was taxed at the lowest marginal estate tax
rate. In addition, the exemption for the first $30,000 of gifts made during a donor's lifetime
was available in addition to the $60,000 estate tax exemption, and nominal gift tax rates
were fixed at three-quarters of the nominal estate tax rates. See Kurtz & Surrey, Reform of
Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals, the Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1371-72 (1970). This dual tax structure conferred substantial advan-
tages on the judicious division of wealth transmission between lifetime gifts and transfers at
death and was the subject of persistent criticism. See HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS
AND SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SEss., TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS
UNITFED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT 329-409 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as
TREASURY PROPOSALS], reprinted in relevant part in STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
183, 231-309 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 STAFF MATERIALS]; AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI
STUDY], reprinted in part in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS, supra, at 311-79; C. SHOUP, FEDERAL
ESTATE Am GIFT TAxES (1966); TREASURY DEPARTMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE & OFFICE OF
TAx LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES: A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION
AND FOR CORRELATION WITH THE INCOME TAx (1947); Casner, American Law Institute Fed-
Wealth Transfer Tax Timing
a regime that taxes the cumulative total of an individual's lifetime
taxable gifts and his taxable estate at death, under a single (or
"unified") graduated table of rates.4 Nevertheless, there remains a
signficant difference between the taxation of gifts and estates.
Under existing law, the gift tax base systematically excludes the
transfer tax paid, whereas the estate tax base does not.5 As a re-
sult, effective gift tax rates are systematically lower than estate tax
rates,6 and the system that we actually have is something less than
eral Estate and Gift Tax Project, 22 TAx L. REv. 515 (1967); Dewind, The Approaching
Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 79 (1950); Eisenstein, The
Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAx L. Rav. 223 (1956); Surrey, An Intoduction to
Revision of the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1950); Westfall, Revi-
talizing the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARV. L. REv. 986 (1970). The most persis-
tent criticisms of the pre-1976 system were: first, that it placed an undue premium on tech-
niques for taking advantage of more lenient gift taxation; second, that congressional efforts
to forestall untrammeled access to those techniques greatly complicated the estate tax; and
third, that the advantageous treatment it conferred on lifetime gifts operated to favor the
extremely wealthy, who could afford to part with some of their wealth while living, over
those who, while sufficiently well-to-do to be subject to the wealth-transfer taxes, were in-
sufficiently wealthy to part with what they had while they were alive. See, e.g., TREASURY
PROPOSALS, supra, at 351-55, reprinted in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS, supra, at 251-55; C.
SHOUP, supra, at 14-17, 26-28, 127-28; Casner, supra, at 533; Dewind, supra, at 82-85, 93-94;
Eisenstein, supra, at 244-45; Kurtz & Surrey, supra, at 1368, 1371-76; Surrey, supra, at 9-
10.
, I.R.C. §§ 2001(b)-(c), 2502(a) (1982). The unified rate structure operates with respect
to lifetime gifts by adding each successive taxable gift to the sum of all prior taxable gifts,
ascertaining a "tentative tax" on the total under the graduated rate table contained in
I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1982), and then subtracting from that "tentative tax" the sum of the gift
taxes already paid with respect to prior taxable transfers. I.R.C. § 2502(a) (1982). The tech-
nique of cumulating each gift with all prior gifts for purposes of computing the "tentative
tax" ensures taxation of each incremental wealth transfer at the proper marginal rate. The
provision for subtracting gift taxes already paid from the "tentative tax" ensures that no
gift is taxed more than once.
At death, a "tentative tax" is again computed on the sum of the decedent's aggregate
lifetime taxable gifts-referred to as the decedents "adjusted taxable gifts"-plus the dece-
dent's taxable estate, from which there is subtracted the sum of all gift taxes paid. I.R.C. §
2001(b) (1982). Once again, the technique of cumulating, computing a "tentative tax," and
then subtracting gift taxes paid, operates both to tax the estate at the proper marginal rate
(taking into account the amount of the decedent's taxable lifetime gifts), and to forestall
taxation of any wealth transfer under both the gift and estate taxes.
The gift and estate taxes now are subject to a single, overall exemption, effectuated
through a "unified credit" against tax. LR.C. §§ 2010(a) (estate tax), 2505(a) (gift tax)
(1982).
5 See, e.g., S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANiEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAxATioN 267-271 (2d ed. 1982); Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3, at 1373.
1 In reality, lifetime giving is favored in yet another, cumulatively significant way. Each
individual is allowed an "annual exclusion" for gifts of up to $10,000 to each donee. See
I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982). The original rationale for an annual exclusion was to avoid the need
for payment of tax in connection with modest, recurring gifts. See H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1982); cf. Dickman v. Commissioner, 104 S. Ct. 1086, 1093 (1984) (hold-
ing that interest-free loans give rise to gift tax on the interest foregone, noting that existing
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a truly "unified" wealth-transfer tax.
What follows is an appraisal of two different means of rectify-
ing the remaining discrepancy between the taxation of gifts and
estates. One approach would correct for the difference in tax bases
by adjusting the transferor's estate for tax purposes. This approach
is presaged by section 2035(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 (the Code), added by the 1976 Act, which prescribes just such
an adjustment for taxable gifts made within three years before the
transferor's death.7 The other approach would modify the way in
which we now tax lifetime gifts. A modification of this sort was
proposed by the Treasury Department in 1969, but has never been
adopted by Congress." Either change would eliminate the existing
difference in the treatment of taxable gifts and estates, at least in
nominal terms,9 and in some sense each would thereby "unify" the
gift and estate taxes. But the timing of the adjustment under the
two approaches differs. Consequently, a comparision of the two
leads to an examination of some implications of transfer tax
timing.10
It is not clear how receptive Congress currently would be to
creating a truly unified gift and estate tax. In the eyes of many, the
1976 legislation significantly improved the structure of the sys-
"exclusions, exceptions, and credits clearly absorb. . . de minimis gifts"). Nevertheless, the
size of the exclusion, which was increased from $3,000 to $10,000 by § 441(a) of the Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, tit. IV, § 441(a), 95 Stat. 172, 319 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982)), and the fact that it applies per donee each year, means that
quite substantial amounts can be transmitted through recurring annual gifts.
What is more, the looming $600,000 basic gift and estate tax exemption, combined with
an unlimited marital deduction, see infra note 12, makes the universe of decedents suffi-
ciently wealthy to be subject to the estate tax quite small. See Gutman, Reforming Federal
Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REv. 1187, 1207-08 (1983). For these fortu-
nate (or unfortunate) individuals, however, the difference between the taxation of estates
and taxable gifts can significantly influence transfer tax planning. See infra Part H.
7 I.R.C. § 2035(c) (1982) (added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2001(a)(5), 90 Stat. 1520, 1848-49). For a discussion of the origins and
the significance of § 2035(c), see infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
8 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 355, 369, reprinted in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS,
supra note 3, at 255, 269. For a discussion of the modification proposed by the Treasury, see
infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
' That is, either approach would restore the same number of dollars to the transfer-tax
base, disregarding the time at which some part of those dollars was taxed, see infra Part III,
and any implications of that difference in timing. See infra Part IV.
10 The literature on the implications of timing in the transfer tax context is virtually
nonexistent. By contrast, the literature concerning timing under the income tax is too volu-
minous even to mention. This difference may reflect the relative contribution to federal
revenues of the wealth transfer taxes and the income tax. See Graetz, To Praise the Estate
Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 263-69 (1983).
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tern.11 Subsequently, as part of the tax reductions enacted by the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (the 1981 Act), the basic
transfer tax exemption was trebled and the degree of graduation in
the transfer tax rates was reduced by nearly one-third. 12 Structural
reform of the wealth transfer taxes thus was followed shortly by a
sharp reduction in their impact. Although in 1981 the Reagan Ad-
ministration was at least tolerant of these developments, it has re-
sisted further efforts to weaken the taxes.13 The import of this re-
cent activity for the future of transfer tax legislation is anyone's
guess.
The direction in which the transfer tax system ought to evolve
is likewise unclear. The estate tax enacted in 1916 was the product
of both a wartime need for revenues and congressional reluctance
to enlarge the extent to which the federal government was financed
by tariffs and other taxes on consumption.1 ' The gift tax was later
enacted to rectify the nearly wholesale evisceration of the estate
tax at the hands of the Supreme Court. 5 Apart from adding mod-
estly to federal revenues, the rationale for these taxes never has
been self-evident.16 Lack of clarity about objectives tends to pro-
mote uncertainty about the proper contours of the tax.
Against this background of general uncertainty both as to
1' See, e.g., S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDARmL & H. GuTmAN, supra note 5, at 268-
71; Graetz, supra note 10, at 260.
12 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, tit. IV, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 95
Stat. 122, 299, 300 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2010(a), 2001(c) (1982)). The 1981 Act increased the
"unified credit," through which the basic exemption from tax is effectuated, see supra note
4, from $47,000 to $192,800, raising the effective exemption (or "exemption equivalent")
from $175,000 to $600,000. It also reduced the top marginal rate from 70% to 50%. Both the
increase in exemption and the reduction in rates were phased in over several years. I.R.C. §§
2010(b), 2001(c)(2) (1982). Finally, the 1981 Act repealed the pre-existing limits on both the
gift and estate tax marital deduction. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-34, tit. IV, §§ 403(a)-(b), 95 Stat. 172, 301 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (1982)). For a
discussion of the 1981 Act, see Graetz, supra note 10, at 262-63.
is See Estate Tax Issues-1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Estate and Gift
Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-67 (1983) (statement of
Robert G. Woodward, Acting Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Treasury Dep't) [hereinafter
cited as 1983 Senate Hearings]. Fluctuation in sentiment toward these taxes has a long
history. See Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 224-38.
14 See H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1916); see also Eisenstein, supra
note 3, at 230 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 922).
" See infra notes 51, 62.
10 For an entertaining capsule review of the history through 1950, see Eisenstein, supra
note 3, at 224-38; see also C. SHOUP, supra note 3, at 101-06; Gutman, supra note 6, at 1187-
89; Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3, at 1367 (all considering the aims of transfer taxation).
The view has begun to emerge recently that a wealth transfer tax can properly serve to
shore up the progressivity of the income tax. See Graetz, supra note 10, at 271-73; Gutman,
supra note 6, at 1193-97.
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what is appropriate and what likely, the following discussion as-
sumes that we shall retain the gift and estate taxes in roughly their
current form for the foreseeable future. Given that assumption,
achieving a unification of the gift and estate tax bases is desira-
ble.17 There seems to be no compelling reason to tax lifetime trans-
fers more leniently than transfers at death,18 and eliminating the
difference could pave the way for substantial estate tax simplifica-
tion."e The enactment of section 2035(c)20 in 1976 was a step in the
right direction. This article examines whether it was the right step
to take.
Using numerical examples, Part I identifies in concrete terms
the remaining difference between the treatment of taxable gifts
and taxable estates, assuming for simplicity a world with a single
transfer tax rate. Part II examines briefly some of the complicating
features of our wealth-transfer taxes that are more or less directly
attributable to differences in the way we historically have taxed
gifts and estates. Part III describes what appear to be the two
principal means of rectifying the difference, and Part IV compares
their operation. The conclusion emerges from Parts III and IV
that, if real unification of the transfer taxes is the objective, the
step actually taken by Congress in 1976 was in principle the less
desirable of the alternatives. Part V then develops a method by
which the alternative advocated by the Treasury in 1969-so-
called "grossed-up" taxation of gifts-can be easily implemented,
even in a world with graduated transfer tax rates.
In many ways the issues can more clearly and generally be
posed and analyzed through simple algebra. Rather than cluttering
the text with equations, however, I have elected to recapitulate the
central analysis algebraically in an appendix. For those already fa-
miliar with the problem and possessing the patience to deal with
the algebra, an immediate detour to Appendix A may be
appropriate.
1'7 For simplicity of exposition, this discussion is confined to the gift and estate taxes,
putting aside the so-called generation-skipping transfer tax, which since its enactment in
1976 has been embroiled in controversy. See, e.g., 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at
56-63. Just how the analysis that follows might apply to that tax would depend on the form
in which the tax emerges from the controversy.
18 See, e.g., Dewind, supra note 3, at 93-94, 106-07; Wales, Consistency in Taxes-The
Rationale of Integration and Correlation, 3 TAx L. REv. 173, 176-77 (1947). A contrary
viewpoint is expressed by the authorities cited infra note 113.
19 See infra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
20 I.R.C. § 2035(c) (1982), discussed supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra notes
103-07 and accompanying text.
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I. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
More lenient taxation of lifetime gifts, even under uniform gift
and estate tax rates, arises from a disparity in the tax bases to
which those rates are applied. The estate tax base-the "taxable
estate"-includes the entire stock of wealth, after allowable deduc-
tions, left by an individual at death.21 Tax is levied on the taxable
estate in its entirety.22 A part of the estate is then paid as tax,
while the balance-which we might refer to as the "estate after
tax"--is distributed to the designated recipients. The estate tax
is therefore imposed both on what passes to private distributees
and what must be paid as tax.24
With lifetime gifts, the occasion for imposing tax is the volun-
tary conveyance of part of the transferor's wealth to a private re-
cipient. The gift tax base-the "taxable gift"-is the value of the
private wealth transfer, excluding what the transferor then must
pay to the government in tax.25 The gift tax base thus corresponds
with the "estate after tax" in the case of a transfer at death, not
with the "taxable estate." For convenience, the estate tax base may
31 I.R.C. §§ 2032, 2033, 2051 (1982). Assets not actually in the decedent's possession at
death also may be included in his estate. See, e.g., id. §§ 2036-2038 (returning to the taxable
estate lifetime gifts with retained powers or interests), discussed infra notes 52-74 and ac-
companying text; § 2041 (property subject to a power of appointment).
2 I.R.C. § 2001(a) (1982). There are allowed, against the estate tax as computed under
§ 2001(a), not only the "unified credit" through which the basic exemption is given effect,
see supra note 4, but also a credit for state death taxes, LR.C. § 2011 (1982), a credit for
transfer taxes imposed by reason of wealth transfers to the decedent close to the date of
decedent's death, id. § 2013, and a credit for certain foreign death taxes, id. § 2014.
23 The concept of an "estate after tax," used here to denote an individual's transferable
wealth after payment of estate tax, is not a statutory term of art, and is only loosely descrip-
tive. Strictly speaking, an individual's transferable wealth may exceed the difference be-
tween his (or her) "taxable estate" and the estate tax payable. For example, gifts to charita-
ble recipients may be deductible under I.R.C. § 2055 (1982) in computing the decedent's
"taxable estate," even though the amount for which a deduction is allowed may constitute
value in the estate that is actually transmitted to the charity. Similarly, the fair market
value of assets available for transfer to noncharitable recipients may exceed the amount of
the "taxable estate" minus the estate tax paid. This may occur, for example, where the
assets of the estate include property eligible for "special use" valuation under LR.C. §
2032A (1982).
To simplify the analysis, I assume throughout this article that the decedent's "taxable
estate" corresponds to his or her transferable wealth before estate tax, and that the entire
"estate after tax" is to be distributed to private, noncharitable recipients.
24 See S. SuRREY, W. WARmN, P. McDANm & H. GUTmi , supra note 5, at 269; Gut-
man, supra note 6, at 1249 & n.185; Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3, at 1372-73.
211 I.R.C. §§ 2501(a)(1), 2503(a), 2512(a) (1982). The obligation to pay gift tax is the
transferor's. Efforts to arrange for satisfaction of gift taxes by the recipient of a gift have led
to vexing income tax issues only recently (and only partly) resolved by the Supreme Court.
See Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 194-200 (1982).
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be described as "tax-inclusive," whereas the gift tax base is "tax-
exclusive"; 26 or, as it is sometimes put colloquially, the gift tax
does not impose a "tax on the tax. '27 The result is that, for
equivalent after-tax transfers, the gift tax base is systematically
smaller than the estate tax base. Thus, where nominally identical
tax rates apply to apparently equivalent transfers, a lifetime
wealth transfer is taxed at a lower effective rate than is a compara-
ble transfer at death. 8
Two simple examples serve to illustrate this difference. Each
assumes a transferor (T) who has wealth of $100 available for
transfer, and the levy of a 40% tax on each dollar transferred.
Example 1
If T's wealth of $100 were transferred at death, T's taxable
estate would be $100, and the tax at 40% would be $40. T's
estate after tax-the net private wealth transfer-would be
$100 minus $40, or $60.
Example 2 examines the consequence to T of making a lifetime gift
equal to the $60 estate after tax in Example 1.
Example 2
If $60 were transferred by lifetime gift, the taxable gift would
be $60 and the gift tax, at 40%, would be $24.
In Example 2, the transfer tax associated with a $60 after-tax
transfer is $24, rather than $40 as in Example 1, even though the
nominal tax rate is 40% in each case. 9 Expressed consistently as
percentages of the sum of the private wealth transfer plus wealth
transfer tax-that is, compared on a "tax-inclusive" basis-the ef-
fective estate tax rate is 40% ($40/$100), whereas the effective gift
tax rate is only 28.6% ($24/$84). A comparable relationship holds
for all positive nominal transfer tax rates.30
26 The terminology is borrowed from Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption
Tax, 92 HARv. L. Rav. 1575, 1582-83 (1979).
27 See, e.g., Casner, supra note 3, at 534; Dewind, supra note 3, at 105; Eisenstein,
supra note 3, at 244; authorities cited supra note 24.
28 See, e.g., Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3, at 1373.
29 To put the comparison differently, if T wished to dispose of the entire $100 by gift,
he could transfer $71.43. The gift tax, at 40%, would be $28.57, and the total tax and trans-
fer would add up to $100. A lifetime gift of fully $100 would require the transferor to pos-
sess $140 in all, so as to be able to satisfy a gift tax liability of $40. Regardless of whether
the gift is of $60, $71.43 or $100, the effective gift tax rate is unaffected. See infra note 30.
30 Compared in this fashion the effective gift tax rate will equal t1(1 + t) where the
effective estate tax rate is t. See Graetz, supra note 26, at 1583 n.25 (deriving formula);
infra note 99 and accompanying text; see also Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3, at 1373 (estate
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As first enacted in 1932,-1 the gift tax was made explicitly less
onerous than the estate tax, 2 and it remained so for over forty
years. The advent of a unified rate schedule and exemption in 1976
eliminated most of the explicit advantages.33 But, as illustrated by
Examples 1 and 2, these changes simply reduced the size of the
overall advantage to lifetime giving.3 4
No explanation is given by the reports on the Revenue Act of
1932 for the original enactment of a gift tax with a base that dif-
fered from the estate tax base.3 5 One surmises that, when Congress
was fashioning the estate tax in 1916,6 the decedent's aggregate
estate, after allowable deductions but before extraction of the tax,
fell to hand as the most natural object of the levy.3 7 In contrast,
the most readily observable aspect of a lifetime gift is the size of
the private wealth transfer. Simple convenience, then, originally
may have accounted for the difference. Even if Congress had
thought about the problem, it might not have been overly con-
cerned in 1932, since it was determined to tax lifetime gifts more
leniently than estates in any event.,38 Whatever the original rea-
sons, the disparity survives to this day. The congressional willing-
ness to make substantial revisions to the gift and estate taxes in
1976 did not extend to eliminating the difference in the tax bases.3 9
tax rates applied to aggregate estate; gift tax rates applied to net transfer).
31 A gift tax law with almost no teeth was enacted in 1924, Revenue Act of 1924, Pub.
L. No. 68-176, tit. III, §§ 319-324, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16, but was repealed by the Revenue Act
of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, tit. XII, § 1200, 44 Stat. (pt. 2) 125-26. For an historical account
of this legislation, see Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 232-34. The current gift tax statute is
codified at I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (1982).
3' See Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, tit. H, § 401(b), 47 Stat. 169, 243
(estate tax rate schedule beginning at 1% on net estates not in excess of $10,000); id. tit. III,
§ 502, 47 Stat. 169, 246 (gift tax rate schedule beginning at three-quarters of 1% on net gifts
not in excess of $10,000). The legislative history of these provisions acknowledges the differ-
ence. See H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1932).
" The enactment of the unified rate schedule and unified credit deprived transferors of
the ability to secure the benefit of separate gift and estate tax exemptions and to secure
taxation of transfers at lower marginal rates, through the use of lifetime gifts. See S. SuR-
RY, W. WARREN, P. McDANEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 5, at 268-71; supra notes 3-4.
3 For further elaboration of this point, see infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
35 See H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-30 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 11, 38-41 (1932).
' See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
37 See H.R. RaP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1916).
38 See supra notes 32, 35 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
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II. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF MORE LENIENT TAXATION OF GIFTS
The common objective of the gift and estate taxes is the tax-
ation of the gratuitous transmission of wealth.40 This itself implies
that consistency in the imposition of the taxes is desirable.41 Nev-
ertheless, since 1916 Congress has continuously been content with
less rigorous taxation of gifts. 42 In that environment it is hardly
surprising that taxpayers endeavored to subject gratuitous wealth
transfers to the gift tax in lieu of the estate tax. Such efforts, and
the congressional responses they have stimulated, account for
much of the complexity that characterizes these taxes to this day. 3
Recognizing the advantages to lifetime giving, an individual
possessing wealth destined sooner or later to pass to a younger
generation can, very generally, do one of two things. Most obvi-
ously, he can simply give away some of it now, thereby incurring
the equally obvious disadvantage that control of the gift passes im-
mediately to the succeeding generation. But he might also resort to
more enterprising arrangements, trading on the fact that the line
between lifetime gifts and transfers at death can be far from self-
evident. Thus, an individual might create-through what in form
are lifetime transfers and are typically (although not invariably) in
trust-interests in his wealth which provide for eventual transmis-
sion to the ultimate beneficiaries while retaining strings that pre-
serve use, control, or other benefits of ownership for himself in the
interim.4" The general objective of such arrangements is to secure
more lenient gift taxation of wealth transfers that in one sense or
another do not become "complete" until the transferor's death. 5
40 See Andrews, What's Fair About Death Taxes?, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 465, 467 (1973);
Wales, supra note 18, at 176-77.
41 See Wales, supra note 18, at 176.
4' See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDArsr. & H. GuTMAN, supra note 5, at 4-13. The
history through 1950 is recounted in Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 224-38.
4' See supra note 3.
4 See, e.g., May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1930); Commissioner v. Northern
Trust Co., 41 F.2d 732, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1930), aff'd sub nom. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co.,
283 U.S. 782 (1931) (both holding that decedent's retention of an income interest for life in
property transferred to a trust does not subject the trust corpus to the estate tax); cf. ALI
STUDY, supra note 3, at 26-28 reprinted in 1976 STAFF MATERIALs, supra note 3, at 348-50
(discussing judicial construction of "gross estate" and congressional response); C. SHoup,
supra note 3, at 26-28 (examining the mechanisms for policing incomplete transfers and
gifts made in contemplation of death in I.R.C. §§ 2035, 2036, 2038); Eisenstein, supra note
3, at 243 (estate tax base includes various types of inter-vivos transfers that are convenient
will substitutes).
"I See ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 62-64 (discussing congressional responses to efforts
to avoid estate tax by use of inter-vivos transfers). For a more detailed discussion of the
statutory provisions that subject "incomplete" inter-vivos transfers to the estate tax, see
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The benefits of congressional tolerance of a comparatively le-
nient gift tax will ineluctably accrue to those willing to make out-
right gifts. Nevertheless, Congress has remained anxious to confine
more lenient taxation to transfers that "truly" are lifetime gifts,
and to forestall its extension to what are substitutes for, or in ef-
fect are, transfers at death.48 The resulting tension is manifest in a
complex statutory scheme that deters various efforts to capitalize
on advantageous taxation of gifts. Indeed, from its very inception,
the estate tax has struggled with the treatment of outright gifts
apparently motivated by the imminence of death (and of transfer
taxation in any event)-so-called "deathbed gifts"-and with the
treatment of lifetime gifts "with strings attached."
Section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1916, the statute that
first enacted the modern estate tax, contained a rudimentary pro-
vision subjecting to tax both transfers "in contemplation of" a de-
cedent's death and transfers "intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after his death.' 47 Over time, this provision
evolved into what are now sections 2035-2038 of the Code.4 Until
1976, deathbed gifts were dealt with by section 2035(a) or its pred-
ecessors.49 The problem of incomplete lifetime transfers was and
continues to be dealt with largely by sections 2036, 2037, and
2038.50
If successful, a deathbed gift could secure taxation of a wealth
transfer at the explicitly lower marginal gift tax rates, applied to a
tax base that (in contrast with the estate tax base) did not include
the amount of the tax itself. For sixty years, therefore, one version
or another of section 2035(a) endeavored to subject such gifts to
taxation in a decedent's estate .5  There was no end of litigation.2
infra notes 63-90 and accompanying text.
4, See ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 62-64.
47 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, tit. II, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 756, 777-78 (cur-
rent version at I.R.C. §§ 2035-2038 (1982)).
48 I.R.C. §§ 2035-2038 (1982).
49 See I.R.C. § 2035(a) (1982) (including in the gross estates "the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer
• . . by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of his death"). For a discussion of the history of
§ 2035(a), see infra note 51.
50 I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038 (1982).
81 Section 2035(a) had a curious history, which brought it more or less full circle just as
it became more or less superfluous. As enacted in 1916, the estate tax contained a rebuttable
presumption-presumably inserted because no gift tax was enacted in 1916-that the trans-
fer of a material part of the decedents estate during the two years preceding his death was
"in contemplation of death." Such transfers were required to be included in the decedent's
estate for tax purposes. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, tit. II, § 202(b), 39 Stat.
756, 777-78; see also S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANiEL & H. GtrrN, supra note 5, at
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Happily, section 2035(a) was consigned to history by the "adjusted
taxable gifts" rule enacted in 1976, which performs essentially the
same function with respect to all taxable gifts as section 2035(a)
used to fulfill when successfully applied to deathbed gifts. 3 This
consequence of the 1976 changes may have been overlooked in
drafting the 1976 Act itself, but it was noticed shortly thereafter.5 4
In 1981, Congress largely repealed section 2035(a). 5
Two aspects of section 2035(a) are worth mentioning. First, a
gift drawn into a decedent's estate by reason of that section was
valued for estate tax purposes as of the decedent's death, instead
of at its generally lower value on the date of the gift. 6 In contrast,
259-60 (discussing § 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1916). When the gift tax that had been
enacted by the Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, tit. III, §§ 319-324, 43 Stat. 253,
313-16, was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, tit. XII, § 1200, 44
Stat. 9, 126, the presumption was made irrebuttable. The Supreme Court, however, found
that provision to be unconstitutional. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 331 (1932). In the
Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, tit. VI, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 169, 279, Congress there-
fore restored a rebuttable presumption that remained in effect for the ensuing 50 years. The
principal subsequent change was an amendment made by the Revenue Act of 1950 provid-
ing that transfers more than three years before death were presumed not to be in contem-
plation of death. Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 250-51 (discussing Revenue Act of 1950); see
also S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANEmL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 5, at 260 (discussing
Revenue Act of 1950). In the 1976 Act, however, Congress returned to a rule, similar to the
one enacted in 1926, requiring that all gifts made within three years before death be in-
pluded in a decedent's estate. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. XX,
§ 2001(a)(5), 90 Stat. 1520, 1848 (amending I.R.C. § 2035(a)). Simultaneously, however, sec-
tion 2035(a) was rendered largely superfluous by the "adjusted taxable gifts" rule of I.R.C.
§ 2001(b) (1982), discussed supra note 4, infra text at note 53.
51 A brief review of this aspect of the estate tax, circa 1945, concludes with the observa-
tion that "[a]ny tax provision becomes unduly pathetic when it gears liability to such non-
sense as the decedent's happy disposition, his practice of golfing once a week, or his en-
trenched habit of puttering about in his garden." Eisenstein, Are We Ready for Estate and
Gift Tax Revision?, 23 TAxEs 316, 319 (1945). Where the government was successful in in-
voking § 2035(a), and the transfer was restored to the decedent's estate, double taxation of
the same transfer under both the gift and estate taxes was avoided by the allowance of a
credit for the gift tax already paid against the estate tax subsequently levied on the transfer.
See I.R.C. § 2012(a) (1982). Like § 2035(a) itself, see infra text at note 53, this provision was
rendered superfluous by the "adjusted taxable gifts" rule. See I.R.C. § 2012(e) (1982).
53 For a description of the operation of the adjusted taxable gifts rule, see supra note 4.
"The estate and gift tax provisions were a somewhat hasty addition to the statute that
ultimately became the 1976 Act. See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL, & H. GUTMAN,
supra note 5, at 9 (discussing the legislative history of the 1976 Act). This undoubtedly
accounted for a number of flaws in the statute, including the apparently overlooked redun-
dancy of § 2035(a) resulting from the "adjusted taxable gifts" rule of § 2001(b).
.. Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, tit. IV, § 424(a), 95 Stat. 172, 317
(codified at I.R.C. § 2035(d) (1982)). For the legislative history of this amendment, see S.
REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Seass. 138-39 (i981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 SENATE REPORT],
reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 105, 238-39; see also H.R. REP. No. 201,
97th Cong., 1st Seass. 186-87 (1981).
"See 1981 SENATE REPORT, supra note 55, at 138, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG.
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the "adjusted taxable gifts" rule operates on the value of a lifetime
gi.^t at the time it is actually made.57 After 1950, however, section
2035(a) did not apply to gifts made more than three years before
death,58 so it seems a reasonable conjecture that the increase in
value taxed by reason of section 2035(a), but not by the "adjusted
taxable gifts" rule, would not have been breathtaking in the typical
case. Second, section 2035(a) never did put deathbed gifts on ex-
actly the same footing as transfers at death. It drew only the gift,
not the gift tax, into the decedent's estate. Consequently, a gift
included in a decedent's estate under section 2035(a)-in contrast
with property actually owned by the decedent at death-was taxed
on a tax-exclusive basis. The magnitude of this advantage alone
could be substantial;5s and it is one that, but for the advent in 1976
of section 2035(c), 60 would persist to this day.6 1
In contrast with section 2035(a), sections 2036-2038 are still
very much with us.6 2 Their continuing presence reflects an implicit
congressional judgment, even after 1976, that, notwithstanding a
lifetime transfer, retention of enumerated indicia of ownership
should lead to inclusion of the wealth involved, valued as of the
transferor's death, in the transferor's taxable estate. The operation
of these rules can be triggered by the transferor's retention of a
simple beneficial interest for life, of certain reversionary interests,
or of powers over subsequent disposition of the principal or income
& AD. NEws 105, 238; S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANmYL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 5, at
261-65.
', See authorities cited supra, note 56.
68 For a description of the 1950 amendments to § 2035(a), see supra note 51.
6, In one celebrated case a deathbed gift by a member of the DuPont family saved some
$16 million in estate taxes by removing some $21 million in gift taxes payable from the
decedent's estate. See In re Dupont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 303-04, 194 A.2d 309, 311 (1963), noted
in 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1083 (1964).
10 I.R.C. § 2035(c) (1982).
" See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
62 I.R.C. §§ 2036-38 (1982). Like the predecessor of § 2035(a), see supra note 51, these
provisions had their genesis in the Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, tit. II, § 202(b),
39 Stat. 756, 777-78, and initially experienced rough going at the hands of the Supreme
Court. In a series of decisions during the late 1920's and early 1930's, the original language
of the Revenue Act of 1916 was progressively weakened, culminating in a decision that a
lifetime transfer in trust, in which the decedent retained an income interest for the balance
of her life, was not includable in the decedent's estate as a transfer "intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after" the decedent's death. May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238,
243-45 (1930). Partly in response to these decisions, Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1932,
Pub. L. No. 72-154, tit. VI, § 803, 47 Stat. 169, 279-80, considerably strengthened the provi-
sions dealing with "strings attached" gifts. While their subsequent history is somewhat tor-
tuous, they still exist in much the same form they took as the result of the 1932 Act. For a
fairly complete recitation of the history, see S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H.
GurMAN, supra note 5, at 271-304.
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from the transferred property. 3
The manner in which "strings attached" gifts could be used to
secure more lenient gift taxation for what reasonably might be re-
garded as a testamentary transfer, and the way in which sections
2036-2038 respond to such efforts, can be illustrated by modifying
the simple examples developed in Part I. Suppose that, though
cognizant of the tax advantages of lifetime giving, T is unwilling to
part with his $100 now. Although he would be happy to see the
$100 pass to his beneficiaries when he dies, he wants to retain for
hiniself the income from the $100 in the interim. T consults his
lawyer (not a tax expert) who informs him that these competing
objectives might be achieved by creating a trust with a corpus of
$60-the anticipated value of T's estate after tax in Example
1 64-reserving to T the trust income for his life, and providing for
the remainder to pass to T's designated beneficiaries at his death. 5
The income interest for life, not having been transferred, is not
taxed.6 The remainder, a presently transferred future interest that
will be reduced to the beneficiaries' possession at T's death, is a
taxable transfer.6
A complication arises from the fact that, even though the re-
mainder is irrevocably created now, the assets will not pass to the
recipients until some time in the future. To the recipients, the re-
mainder is worth something less than $60, because of the delay be-
tween its creation and the time it is expected to come into their
possession. 8 For tax purposes, its value must be discounted to re-
flect this delay. 9
'3 See I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038 (1982). For a discussion of the rationale for these provisions,
see ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 65-67; S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDIEL & H. GUTMAN,
supra note 5, at 302-04.
See supra text following note 28.
"' Such an arrangement is structurally identical to those upheld by the Supreme Court
in May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), and Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782
(1931) (per curiam), af'g Commissioner v. Northern Trust Co., 41 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1930).
" See I.R.C. §§ 2511(a), 2512(a) (1982); Trees. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958) ("If a donor
transfers by gift less than his entire interest in property, the gift tax is applicable to the
interest transferred.").
67 See Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 187 (1943); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S.
176, 181 (1943) (both holding that a currently transferred future interest is taxable as a gift
at its discounted or present value).
68 See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONomcs 204-09 (2d ed. 1967).
6 See Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2512.9(a)(1)(i) to 25.2512-9(e) (1970). Recently the Treasury
has proposed revisions to these regulations, substituting a 10% discount rate for the 6%
rate used in the 1970 regulations. See Revision of Actuarial Tables and Interest Factors, 48
Fed. Reg. 50,087, 50,108-11 (1983) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 25.2512-5) (proposed Oct.
25, 1983). The proposed regulations became effective on an interim basis on Dec. 1, 1983.
Id. at 50,087.
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To keep matters simple, assume that T's life expectancy and
the appropriate discount rate to be used in valuing the remainder
are such that $100 to be paid on the anticipated date of T's death
is worth $50 today.70 On that assumption, the present (or dis-
counted) gift tax value of an indefeasible right to receive $60 on
the expected date of T's death is $30.71 Assuming no special estate
tax provision, the tax consequences of this transfer would be as
follows:
Example 3
T has made a complete, taxable gift having a gift tax value of
$30. If taxed at 40%, the tax would be $12.
As far as T's beneficiaries are concerned, their receipt at T's
death of this $60 remainder is financially indistinguishable from
their receipt of Ts $60 estate after tax in Example 1. But T will
have managed to secure taxation of the transfer as a gift instead of
as part of his estate, reducing the transfer tax liability from $40
(Example 1) to $12 (Example 3). Of course, it is misleading to com-
pare the nominal value of the $12 gift tax in Example 3 with the
$40 estate tax paid in Example 1. The substitution of a gift tax
payment for an estate tax payment has materially accelerated the
70 Assuming compound interest, the present (or discounted) value of a sum to be re-
ceived in the future is determined by multiplying that sum by 1/(1 + i)f, where n is the
number of periods between the future date and the present, and i is the interest rate per
period. Conversely, the future value of a present sum is given by multiplying the present
sum by (1 + i)l . See A. ALCHAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 68, at 204-09; see also Appendix
A, at 76.
The examples that follow all assume that $100 to be received at the actuarially antici-
pated date of T's death has a value, discounted to the present date of the gift, of $50; in
other words that (1 + i)n = 2, and that 1/(1 + i)n = /2. Note that, once the discounting
assumptions have been fixed, the value of (1 + i)n is constant, so that, given our assump-
tions, the present value of a future sum is always one-half that sum, and the future value of
a present sum is always twice that sum. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 68, at 204-
09.
There are an infinite number of combinations of i and n that will lead to this outcome.
Those wishing to put values on the variables may assume for present purposes that the
discount rate is 10% per annum and that the number of years between the date of the gift
and the anticipated date of T's death is 7.25.
Until recently, Treasury Regulations prescribed the use of a 6% discount rate in valu-
ing a remainder of this sort for gift tax purposes. See Tress. Reg. § 25.2512-9 (1970). Re-
cently, the Treasury proposed revisions to the regulations incorporating a 10% discount
rate. See supra note 69. As a result, the examples in the text are more-or-less faithful to
actual valuations.
71 See authorities cited supra notes 68-69. Note, for comparison, that the $60 estate
after tax in Example 1, supra text following note 28, if discounted on the same assumptions
to its present value as of the hypothesized date of the gift, is also worth $60 x /2 = $30. See
supra note 70.
The University of Chicago Law Review
timing of the payment. An adjustment must be made for this fact
to arrive at a useful basis for comparison. On our discounting as-
sumptions, the $12 gift tax is the equivalent of a tax of $24 to be
paid on the anticipated date of T's death. 2 Thus, by creating a
remainder through lifetime transfer instead of waiting until death,
T could reduce from $40 to $24, or by 40%, the effective tax liabil-
ity associated with the transfer of $60 at his death. This is exactly
the result one would expect, on the basis of Examples 1 and 2,
given the difference in the way we currently tax gifts and estates.73
What is more, although T's beneficiaries still receive $60 at his
death, the fact that the effective tax burden is lower leaves T bet-
ter off in the interim.74 The benefit of the tax advantage thus ac-
crues to T.
Enter section 2036(a)(1). 75 It requires that T's estate include
"the value of all property . . . of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer . . . under which he has retained for his life
. . . the right to the income from" the property.76
Example 4
As applied to the transfer in Example 3, section 2036(a)(1)
would draw the assets in which the remainder was created
into T's estate for tax purposes. Their estate tax value would
be $60. To pay tax on this amount, however, T's estate should
have on hand some additional, unburdened assets, in this in-
stance $20.1" That amount, when added to the $60 remainder,
72 See supra note 70; infra note 120.
73 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. That is, the gift tax associated with a
$60 gift is $24, whereas the estate tax associated with a $60 estate after tax is $40. If the
lifetime creation of the remainder is taxed as a gift, it too attracts the equivalent of a $24
tax paid at death.
74 On the assumptions we have been using, T's right to the income from $100 until the
anticipated date of his death has a discounted value of $50. See infra note 150; Appendix A,
at 76. Where, as in Example 3, T instead transfers $60 in trust but retains an income inter-
est in the $60 for his life, the discounted value of the retained income interest is $30. But,
after his transfer of $60 to the trust and payment of the $12 gift tax resulting from the
transfer, T is left with $100 - $60 - $12 = $28. The aggregate value of what T is left with
is the sum of (1) the discounted value of the income interest ($30), plus (2) the cash ($28),
or $58.
In present value, T is $8 better off. This advantage corresponds with the reduction in
the effective transfer tax liability, valued as of T's death ($40 in Example 1 as contrasted
with $24 in Example 3), of $16. The value of $16 discounted to the present from the antici-
pated date of T's death is $8. The significance of the $28 remaining in T's possession in
Example 3 will be considered further, infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
75 I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1982).
76 Id.
7 Although irrevocably transferred and thus not available to the decedent's personal
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would bring T's taxable estate to $80. The "tentative" estate
tax on $80 (at 40%) is $32. To avoid double taxation of the
same transfer under both the gift tax and the estate tax, the
$12 gift tax paid in Example 3 is subtracted from the $32
"tentative" estate tax, leaving a net estate tax payable of
$20.78
Because of the intervention of section 2036(a)(1), T and his
estate now have incurred gift and estate taxes nominally amount-
ing to $32. As before, however, the $12 gift tax, paid well in ad-
vance of T's death, must be viewed as the equivalent of a $24 tax
paid at death. 9 With this adjustment the total transfer taxes have
a value at T's death of $44-gift tax with a date-of-death value of
$24 plus estate tax of $20.80 Thus, in connection with the ultimate
transmission of $60 at T's death, through the lifetime creation of
the remainder depicted in Example 3, section 2036(a)(1) operates
to impose a more burdensome combination of gift and estate taxes
than if T had never bothered to consult his lawyer in the first
place.8 " What is more, this additional tax is financed at the cost of
T's well-being in the interim. 2
In other words, section 2036(a)(1) actively deters the lifetime
creation of remainders subject to retained life interests. Unlike sec-
representative, the $60 date-of-death value of the remainder is part of T's taxable estate by
reason of I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1982). Thus, T's estate should have on hand cash equal to a
tax on the sum of (1) the $60 remainder, plus (2) the cash, reduced by (3) the $12 gift tax
already paid (the subtraction of which is called for by I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1982), see supra
note 4. At a 40% tax rate, the amount of cash, x, must equal .4(60 + x) - $12, so that x =
$20. Note that the amount that must remain in T's estate is less than the $28 remaining in
T's possession after he created the remainder and paid the gift tax. See supra note 74.
78 I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1982). For a description of the process of computing a tentative tax
and the mechanism for taking account of taxable lifetime gifts in taxing a decedents estate,
see supra note 4.
79 See supra note 70; text accompanying note 72.
10 The value of the total taxes, discounted to the date of the original gift, is $22. The
$20 estate tax, discounted from T's death to the date of gift, has a value of $20 x 2 or $10,
see supra note 70, to which must be added the gift tax of $12.
81 Compare supra text following note 28 (Example 1).
82 On the assumption that only the $60 in which the remainder was created will be left
by T to pass to his beneficiaries, T will be left with $28 after creation of the remainder and
payment of the tax, so that the total value of what T retains-consisting of that $28 plus the
$30 value of his income interest in the trust-is $58. See supra note 74.
But T should provide for $20 of the $28 to pass to his estate, so that it will have the
wherewithal to pay the estate tax on the remainder, see supra notes 77-78 and accompany-
ing text, at least if this scheme ever were to be effectuated by design. The discounted value
of the $20 left to T's estate is $10, see supra note 70, so that the value of what T retains is
$58 - $10 = $48. T thus has $2 less to consume than he would have had if he had done
nothing-an amount that equals the discounted value of the increase in the transfer tax
burden. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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tion 2035(a), however, it was not made superfluous by the changes
enacted in 1976.83 Without it, transfers with retained life interests
would continue to be advantageous, even after the advent of a uni-
fied rate schedule and exemption, because of the continuing differ-
ence between the gift and estate tax bases.84
The object of this discussion is simply to illustrate the pos-
sibilities for manipulation of the still-existing difference in the tax-
ation of gifts and estates, not to examine in detail the operation of
the estate tax rules that Congress has interposed to deal with the
problem. That said, I should add that the application of the gift
and estate taxes to lifetime transfers subject to retained life inter-
ests is no more than a modest introduction to the complications
created by sections 2036-2038. Transfers subject to these provi-
sions can become enmeshed in a complex web of statutory and
judge-made rules.8 5 As with transfers subject to retained life inter-
ests, some arrangments may be taxed under both the gift and es-
tate taxes."' In other instances, a "strings-attached" transfer will
not be taxed at the time of its creation, but at some later date
when the originally retained powers or interests are relinquished.8 7
In still others, a transfer may fall within the ambit of more than
one of these provisions."8 What is more, the law on when a lifetime
transfer becomes sufficiently "complete" to be subject to the gift
tax has developed largely in the absence of any statutory gift tax
rules, leaving the courts to attempt, insofar as they have found it
feasible, to minimize the extent to which wealth transfers would be
subject to both the gift and estate taxes.89 Taken together, the
83 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
I See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. For a somewhat contrary view, see
Isenbergh, Simplifying Retained Life Interests, Revocable Transfers, and the Marital De-
duction, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 2-16 (1984)-
88 See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDAsimL & H. GuTmAN, supra note 5, at 302-85;
Dewind, supra note 3, at 82-84 (discussing the tax treatment of transfers covered by
§§ 2036-2038).
88 See, e.g., Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 (1943) (remainder taxed as a gift
on creation even though conceded to be taxable as part of transferor's estate at death).
87 See, e.g., Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U.S. 54, 56 (1939) (creation of a trust, under
which the settlor reserved a power to redesignate remainder beneficiaries but retained no
power to revest principal in himself, held not to be a completed gift); Estate of Sanford v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 46 (1939) (final relinquishment of a power similar to that re-
tained in Rasquin v. Humphreys held to be taxable as a gift on relinquishment).
88 See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601, 602 (1st Cir. 1970)
(trust within the scope of both § 2036(a)(2) and § 2038(a)(1)).
89 See Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 46 (1939). The basic thrust of
Estate of Sanford is that, if a gift is in a form such that it will be drawn into a decedents
estate by the operation of §§ 2036-2038, it will be considered "incomplete" when made and
not subject to the gift tax. But see, e.g., Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 (1943)
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rules are formidably complex. In general, the weight of the system
tenids to fall on the side of not taxing such arrangements at the
time of their creation. In other words, lifetime wealth transfers
subject to retained powers or interests are "hard to complete" for
gift tax purposes, and are more likely to be exposed to transfer
taxation at death.90
For present purposes the important point is that the machin-
ery with which we police the use of "strings attached" lifetime
transfers is a principal source, possibly the principal source, of
complication in our transfer tax system. Since lifetime wealth
transfers can so readily be deployed to achieve what are essentially
testamentary objectives, such complications are an inevitable fea-
ture of a system that tolerates comparatively lenient taxation of
lifetime gifts.91 Ridding the system of these problems has been a
major focus of most studies of transfer tax revision.9 2
The degree of advantage enjoyed by lifetime gifts obviously
was reduced by the revisions to the transfer tax rate and exemp-
tion structure enacted in 1976.98 Less obviously, it was moderated
further by the rate reductions enacted in 1981.1" But to the extent
that we continue to tax gifts more leniently than we do estates,
that fact alone will (and should) influence the extent to which, as a
matter of policy, lifetime gifts are made "difficult" or "easy" to
complete for transfer tax purposes, and will affect the degree of
(remainder taxed as a gift on creation even though conceded to be taxable as part of trans-
feror's estate at death).
90 See, e.g., Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 46 (1939) (transfer in trust
not taxable as a gift where the transferor reserved the power to change the beneficiaries; it is
subject to tax at the transferor's death); TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 354-55, re-
printed in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS, supra note 3, at 254-55 (a lifetime transfer over which the
transferor retains sufficient control is taxed as a part of the transferor's estate at death).
91 Cf. Dewind, supra note 3, at 93 (observing that because the gift tax imposes so much
lighter a burden than the estate tax it cannot serve as a substitute for estate taxation).
" See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 3.
93 See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANmL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 5, at 267-71;
Isenbergh, supra note 84, at 6-12.
9 See supra note 12 and accompanying text; Isenbergh, supra note 84, at 12-14.
Achieving taxation of gifts consistent with the taxation of estates requires multiplying the
nominal gift by 1/(1 - t) where t is the nominal estate tax rate, expressed as a decimal
fraction. As t declines, so does the value of 1/(1 - t), thereby reducing the size of the
required adjustment. The net effect is that the advantage conferred on lifetime giving by
not making this adjustment is smaller at lower nominal rates. See infra notes 99, 168-70 and
accompanying text; see also S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note
5, at 269 ("as the tax rates themselves increase as the amount of the transfer increases, the
benefit from the failure to gross-up increases accordingly"); Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3,
at 1373 ("[b]ecause the [gift] tax rates themselves increase as the size of the transfers in-
crease, the failure to include the tax in the base . . .is of increasing advantage as the
amount of the transferor's assets increases").
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complication in the system. Conversely, achieving true neutrality
in the taxation of lifetime transfers and transfers at death might
allow the choice of rules to be made solely on grounds of adminis-
trability, and therefore holds out the possibility of substantial es-
tate tax simplification. 5 Accordingly, the balance of this article
will assume true unification to be a desirable objective, and will
consider how that objective best might be attained.
III. METHODS OF ELIMINATING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GIFT
AND ESTATE TAXATION
If the existing difference between gift and estate taxation
arises from failing to "tax the tax" on a lifetime gift, rectifying it
requires restoring the gift tax paid to the transfer tax base. But
simply taxing the $24 of gift tax in Example 2 does not accomplish
the desired objective; tax at 40% on the gift tax of $24 yields addi-
tional tax of $9.60, or total transfer taxes of $33.60, still less than
the $40 estate tax in Example 1. If all transfers and all transfer
taxes are to be included in the tax base, the additional tax of $9.60
must also be taxed. This second increment of tax is $3.84, bringing
total taxes to $37.44, once again short of $40.
What ultimately is necessary is to find some additional
amount which, when added to the $24 gift tax and taxed together
with the gift tax at 40%, will yield tax equal to the additional
amount. In Example 2, the required additional amount, of course,
turns out to be the $16 remaining after T made the $60 gift and
paid $24 in tax. If both that $16 and the $24 in gift tax were taxed,
" See Isenbergh, supra note 84, at 12-16. A complete discussion of how those rules
might look were the transfer taxes to be completely unified is beyond the scope of this
paper. It is suggestive, however, that in 1969, when the Treasury proposed complete transfer
tax unification, see infra text accompanying notes 96, 98-102, it also proposed a shift from a
"hard-to-complete" to an "easy-to-complete" gift rule. TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 3,
at 361, reprinted in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS, supra note 3, at 261; see also C. SHoup, supra
note 3, at 25 (a completely integrated tax would eliminate or de-emphasize the elaborate
policing provisions necessary in the present system); Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3, at 1375-
76 (because under a unified system there is considerably less or no tax advantage to lifetime
transfers, an "easy to complete" rule becomes possible, taxing lifetime transfers when cre-
ated despite the retention of interests or rights in the property). Professor Surrey, the Assis-
tant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy at the time the Treasury Proposals were for-
mulated, evidently has had second thoughts since 1969. See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P.
McDANmL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 5, at 441-42 (speculating that a more stringent "hard-
to-complete" rule than the one applied at present may be appropriate). The ALI Study
adopted alternate recommendations on the "easy-to-complete" versus "hard-to-complete"
question, depending on whether the dual tax system was preserved or a tax with a unified
rate structure was substituted in its stead. See ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 41-47, reprinted
in 1976 STAF MATERIALS, supra note 3, at 363-69.
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the total increment to the tax base would be $40, attracting addi-
tional tax of $16. Increasing the tax base by $40 thus equalizes the
outcomes in Examples 1 and 2.
When Congress was considering what ultimately became the
transfer tax revisions of the 1976 Act, it had before it two major
studies of the issues involved. The Treasury Department's Tax Re-
form Studies and Proposals (the Treasury Proposals), which rec-
ommended unification of the gift and estate taxes, had been pre-
pared during the twilight of the Johnson Administration and
published in early 1969.96 The American Law Institute's Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation project (the ALI Study), which ex-
amined in detail; but made no final recommendation on, unifica-
tion of the gift and estate tax rate and exemption structure, ap-
peared at about the same time. These two studies took diverging
approaches to rectifying the difference in the gift and estate tax
bases under discussion here.
The Treasury Proposals explicitly addressed the issue. They
proposed altering the computation of tax on a lifetime gift, at the
time the gift was made, so that it would equal the tax associated
with an identical private wealth transfer when made through a de-
cedent's estate.9 8 Although not actually set out in the Treasury
Proposals, the kind of adjustment the Treasury had in mind can
readily be specified. For any given nominal tax rate, t, the adjust-
ment consists of dividing by (1 - t) the gift tax value of a gift.99
96 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 329-409, reprinted in relevant part in 1976
STAFF MATERIALS, supra note 3, at 231-309.
,7ALI STUDY, supra note 3, reprinted in part in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS, supra note 3,
at 311-79. Even though much of the ALI Study was devoted to considering the substitution
of a transfer tax with a unified rate schedule and exemption for the then existing dual estate
and gift taxes, at various levels the ALI appears to have been internally divided over the
advisability of such a change. On this pivotal issue no proposal was presented by the Re-
porters to the Institute itself, and no recommendation was adopted. See id. at 55-57, re-
printed in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS, supra note 3, at 377-79.
Although both the Treasury Proposals and the ALI Study were published before Con-
gress completed work on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487,
estate and gift tax revision did not find its way into the 1969 Act. The House Ways and
Means Committee Report indicated that this omission was due to a shortage of time, and
suggested that the subject would be taken up in the near future. H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. 1,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1645, 1646.
The relevant estate and gift tax recommendations of the Treasury Proposals and a
portion of the ALI Study were reprinted, together with other materials concerning estate
and gift tax revision, for use of the House Ways and Means Committee in early 1976. See
1976 STAFF MATERIALS, supra note 3, at 231-309, 311-79.
'8 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 355, 369, reprinted in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS,
supra note 3, at 255, 269.
, Given a taxable estate E and a tax rate t, the estate tax is tE and the estate after tax
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The quotient is the "taxable" gift. In the context of Example 2-in
which a 40% rate is applied to a $60 gift' ° -° the proper adjust-
ment would be to divide the gift by (1 - .4), or .6. As a result, T's
nominal gift of $60 is transformed into a "taxable" gift of $60/.6, or
$100. The tax base is thereby increased from $60 to $100, and the
gift tax, at 40%, from $24 to $40. These operations bring the tax
imposed on a $60 lifetime gift into line with the tax on a $100 es-
tate. This approach, which Congress declined to incorporate into
the 1976 Act,101 generally is referred to as "grossing-up" the gift. 02
The recommendations of the ALI Study were substantially
more modest. Indeed, as far as one can ascertain, the ALI Study,
while cognizant of the difference between the gift and estate tax
bases, 03 elected not to recommend eliminating the difference, ap-
parently out of concern for creating a disincentive to lifetime giv-
ing.10 4 Nonetheless, the Reporters were sensitive to the substantial
tax savings that could be achieved by using deathbed gifts to fore-
stall the imposition of estate tax on the gift tax that became paya-
ble by reason of the gift.10 5 In recognition of this possibility, the
ALI Study advocated restoring to a decedent's gross estate the tax
on gifts made within two years before death. 06 Congress adopted a
is E - tE, or E(1 - t). For an equivalent after-tax gift of E(l - t), when taxed at rate t,
also to attract tax of tE, it first must be divided by (1 - t). See, e.g., C. SHOUP, supra note
3, at 16-17 (discussing formula for grossing-up the gift tax value of a gift).
100 See supra text preceding note 29.
101 See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-15 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976
HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3356, 3365-69 (accompany-
ing H.R. 14844, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), which was subsequently incorporated into the
1976 Act); H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 607-09 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118, 4246-48.
102 See, e.g., TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 355, 369, reprinted in 1976 STAFF
MATERIALS, supra note 3, at 255, 269; S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANiEL & H. GUTMAN,
supra note 5, at 269; Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3, at 1373.
103 ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 118-19.
'" Id. at 118-20. This issue is discussed further infra notes 113-19 and accompanying
text.
20 See ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 44-45, reprinted in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS, supra
note 3, at 366-67. For a discussion of the then prevailing advantages of deathbed transfers,
see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
100 See ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 44-45, 47, reprinted in 1976 STAFF MATERIALS,
supra note 3, at 366-67, 369. Actually, the ALI Study made two separate but related recom-
mendations, a step dictated by the fact that alternative proposals were needed depending on
whether a "dual" tax system was preserved or a system with a unified rate schedule and
exemption was substituted in its place-a matter on which the ALI Study took no position.
See supra note 97. The proposed restoration to the taxable estate of gift taxes with respect
to gifts within two years before death was advanced in the context of a tax with a unified
rate structure. In the context of a "dual" tax, the ALI Study proposed to include in the
decedent's estate gifts "in contemplation of" death, as under then existing law, and then to
allow a refund of, or to abate any unsatisfied liability for, gift taxes resulting from the gift.
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similar rule when it enacted section 2035(c), 107 which draws into
the estate the gift taxes paid with respect to all gifts made within
three years before death.
With respect to those lifetime transfers to which it applies,
section 2035(c)-like the "gross-up" approach advocated by the
Treasury-can operate to equalize the taxation of gifts and estates.
Referring again to Example 2,108 suppose that, immediately after
making the $60 gift and paying $24 in gift tax, T died, and the
remaining $16 passed to and was taxed in his estate. Suppose also
that section 2035(c) applied to include the $24 gift tax in T's gross
estate for tax purposes, even though only $16 actually passed to his
estate. T's taxable estate would be $40, and the tax, at 40%, would
be $16, entirely depleting the estate.1 9 In total, $60 would have
passed to T's beneficiaries, and $40 would have been paid to the
government, as in Example 1.110 Thus, like the "gross-up" ap-
proach, section 2035(c) appears to bring the taxation of a $60 life-
time gift into line with taxation of an equivalent estate."'
In its existing form, however, section 2035(c) is more limited
than the "gross-up" advocated in the Treasury Proposals; it ap-
plies only to transfers within three years before death. Even where
it does apply, moreover, it differs from the Treasury Proposals in
the matter of timing. The Treasury would have levied a tax-inclu-
sive tax at the time of a gift; the existing system continues to levy
Refund or abatement would have had the effect of bringing the gift taxes back into the
decedent's estate. Id. at 44.
107 I.R.C. § 2035(c) (1982) (added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2001(a)(5), 90 Stat. 1520, 1848-49). See 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 101, at 11-15, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3365-69.
108 See supra text preceeding note 29.
109 Under the actual operation of the "adjusted taxable gifts" rule of I.R.C. § 2001(b)
(1982), discussed supra note 4, the result specified in the text would be achieved by a tech-
nically more elaborate route. A "tentative tax" would be computed on the sum of T's "ad-
justed taxable gifts" (the $60 gift in Example 2) plus his "taxable estate" (consisting of
assets of $16 plus $24 by reason of I.R.C. § 2035(c) (1982), or a total of $40) so that the
"tentative tax" would be .4 x $100 = $40, from which would be subtracted the $24 of gift
tax paid, leaving an estate tax actually payable of $16.
110 See supra text following note 28.
"I Note, however, that I.R.C. § 2035(c) (1982) operates in this fashion only on the as-
sumption that, after its application, the estate has sufficient assets to pay the tax. If, to
change the assumptions in the text, T had had the opportunity to expend for consumption
the entire $16 remaining in his possession after he made the lifetime gift and paid the re-
sulting gift tax, the estate would have a tax liability of $9.60 resulting from the inclusion of
the $24 gift tax under § 2035(c), but there would have been no cash in the estate to pay it.
Thus, § 2035(c) can only operate to unify the transfer tax base if T's estate has other assets
sufficient to pay the tax on whatever amount is included in his estate under § 2035(c), plus
the tax on those other assets. See supra note 77.
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a tax-exclusive gift tax, relying on section 2035(c), where it applies,
to tax the gift tax at the transferor's death. Putting aside the
three-year limitation of existing law, however, it appears that both
section 2035(c) and grossed-up taxation of gifts restore the same
number of dollars to the transfer tax base. As a consequence, ei-
ther approach might form the basis for unifying the gift and estate
tax bases.
IV. COMPARING THE METHODS OF UNIFYING THE GIFT AND ESTATE
TAx BASES
Given two different ways of achieving a unified gift and estate
tax base, is there a principled basis for choosing between the two,
assuming Congress should be disposed to legislate in this area?
The choice entails at least two considerations: first, whether one
method or the other achieves substantively preferable results; and
second, whether one method or the other would be materially eas-
ier to comply with and administer. The object of this part of the
article is to demonstrate that the approach advocated by the the
Treasury in 1969 is superior to section 2035(c) in achieving neu-
trality in the taxation of comparable wealth transfers. The con-
cluding section suggests how the scheme proposed by the Treasury
in 1969 might be implemented simply.
The first of these conclusions is advanced in the face of a dis-
cernible reluctance to tax gifts in the same way that we tax estates,
as the approach advocated in the 1969 Treasury Proposals would
require. In part, this reluctance reflects a general apprehension
about discouraging lifetime wealth transfers unduly.112 This appre-
hension is fortified by the perception that, when an individual
transfers wealth by lifetime gift instead of waiting until death, the
resulting acceleration of the transfer tax payment increases the
real tax cost of making the transfer.1 3 Requiring also that gift
112 See 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 11-15, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3365-69.
See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 119 (arguing that since a donor is deprived of
a gift tax payment earlier than if he had transferred the wealth at death, he "should be
compensated . . . to some extent by an otherwise lower overall cost of making lifetime
transfers"); Collie, Estate and Gift Tax Revision, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 441, 443 (1973) ("The
lower gift tax rates also can be justified ... by the fact that the gift tax is collected earlier
than a corresponding estate tax .... "); cf. Alexander, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation:
The Major Issues Presented in the American Law Institute Project, 22 TAX L. REv. 635,
645 (1967) ("a matter of personal judgment . . .whether lifetime giving should be en-
couraged by more favorable tax treatment or. . .discouraged. . . through a unified trans-
fer tax approach"). But see Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3, at 1390 ("The only way to pro-
vide for an equitable encouragement of gifts is to adopt a unified transfer tax system with
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taxes be computed in the same way as estate taxes, the argument
proceeds, would render the increase in tax cost excessive. 114
In some sense, this apprehension can be viewed as reflecting a
desire to tax lifetime gifts preferentially. 115 If, however, the objec-
tive is simply to avoid discrimination against lifetime giving, such
concerns are misplaced. In financial terms, a tax paid now undeni-
ably has a higher real cost than a tax of identical amount not paya-
ble until sometime in the future. But by the same token, a gift
made now is of greater value to the recipient than a transfer of the
same amount not made until some later date. A sound comparison
of the two must take account of the fact that, in terms of financial
value, the earlier -gift is effectively larger. Thus, the higher real cost
of the tax liability associated with an earlier gift, even when taxed
on exactly the same basis as a later gift, simply reflects the trans-
mission of more real value to the recipient.
Consider T, who (as we have been assuming) has $100 now
and expects to have that same $100 at the anticipated date of his
death (chosen arbitrarily so as to produce, in conjunction with an
equally arbitrary discount rate, a 50% discount from the expected
date of death to the present)."l6 Assume, contrary to existing law,
that a transfer of $100 would attract a tax of $40, regardless of
whether the transfer occurs now or at T's death, so that $60 would
pass to T's beneficiary in either event. If the transfer were made
now, and the recipient invested the $60 at the hypothesized inter-
est rate, she would have $120 at the actuarially predicted date of
T's death. But if T waited until death to transfer the $100, T's
beneficiary then would receive only $60-half as much-after pay-
ment of the $40 estate tax, a difference that is attributable to T's
consumption of the income from $100 in the interim." 7 The fact
gross-up for lifetime transfers and then allow some percentage discount in the rate applica-
ble to gifts as compared to death transfers.").
114 See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 119; Collie, supra note 113, at 443-44.
1ie Such a desire, however, is not invariably regarded as being incompatible with a uni-
fied transfer tax. See C. SHOUP, supra note 3, at 128 (conferees generally favored a unified
system but manifested some support for lower gift tax rates in the interest of inducing more
lifetime giving); Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 3, at 1390 (equitable encouragement of gifts
requires adoption of a unified system with an attendant discount in the gift tax rates).
116 See supra note 70, where the terms of these assumptions are laid out.
11 The difference in what the beneficiary ends up with in the two cases is accounted
for by the fact that, when T waits until death before making the transfer, he retains, rather
than transfers, the right to the income from $100 from the present until the date of his
death. The difference in tax is accounted for by the fact that value retained rather than
transferred is not taxed. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. On our discounting
assumptions, the right to receive the income from $100 from the present until the antici-
pated date of Ts death, if valued as of Ts death, is $100. If discounted to present value it is
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that a $40 tax payment now is twice as costly as a $40 tax payment
made at T's death, at least on our discounting assumptions, l1 8 sim-
ply mirrors the receipt by T's beneficiary of twice as much value if
she receives $60 now instead of $60 at the time of T's death.
Conversely, the process of discounting implies that, expressed
in nominal values, a gift made now will be smaller in amount than
a financially equivalent transfer at death. Correspondingly, the tax
imposed on a present gift should have a lower nominal value than
the tax imposed on a financially equivalent transfer at death.
Looking again to T and his beneficiary for illustration, the
equivalent of a $100 tax-inclusive transfer now, which would at-
tract a tax of $40 and leave $60 after tax for T's beneficiary, is a
$200 transfer on the anticipated date of T's death.1 ' A $200 taxa-
ble estate would attract twice as much estate tax-$80 at a 40%
rate-leaving the recipient with $120.
In other words, the mere fact that gift tax payments are made
earlier than estate tax payments is not a sound basis for taxing
gifts more leniently than estates. Comparisons involving values ex-
pressed consistently-either by reducing all transfers and tax pay-
ments, whenever made, to present value, or by extending them all
to their value as of some future date-are more reliable as a guide
to whether consistent taxation has been achieved. Similarly, a com-
parison of the operation of grossed-up taxation and taxation under
section 2035(c) should focus consistently on present or future
values.1
20
worth $50. See supra note 70; infra note 150; see also Appendix A, at 76.
118 See supra note 70.
119 This amount would pass to T's estate if T, having decided not to make a gift now,
not only preserved the $100 principal for transmission at death, but also refrained in the
interim from expending the income from the $100. If T simply invested the $100 at the
hypothesized rate of interest, he would have $200 on the anticipated date of his death. See
supra note 70. The increase in what the beneficiary receives is offset by a reduction in what
T consumes.
120 The analysis in the text implicitly assumes that it is appropriate to use identical
rates to discount the value of future accessions to wealth and future tax liabilities. Given the
imponderables involved in selecting "the right" discount rate, that assumption a priori
seems to be as reasonable as any other.
Professor Isenbergh points out, however, that in practice this assumption may not be
realistic. Future tax liabilities, he maintains, should be reduced to present value using a
higher discount rate, reflecting greater uncertainty. Isenbergh, supra note 84, at 11-12; Isen-
bergh, Further Notes on Transfer Tax Rates, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 91, 93-94 (1984).
What his point appears to boil down to is that, ineluctable though both may be, death
is more inevitable than taxes. There may be merit to that, although its resolution (even in
this limited context) is in some respects a matter of speculation. In any event, it seems to
me appropriate to confront the issue in its purest form, before proceeding to possible refine-
ments based on informed judgment.
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A. Transfers with Retained Life Interests
A comparison of the application of section 2035(c) and
grossed-up taxation to transfers subject to retained life interests
requires us to revisit Example 3.121 There, T created a remainder
interest in $60 through a lifetime transfer, the remainder was val-
ued at $30 for gift tax purposes, and the gift tax, at a 40% rate,
was $12-the equivalent of a $24 tax to be paid at the anticipated
date of T's death.
These events left T with $28-his original $100 minus $60 in
which the remainder was created minus gift tax of $12. Assuming
T did not expend those assets for consumption in the interim, they
would pass to his estate at death.122 In the absence of a provision
like section 2036(a)(1),1 2; and assuming for the moment that sec-
tion 2035(c) 12" does not apply, T's taxable estate would be limited
to the $28 in his possession at his death, the estate tax on which, at
40%, would be $11.20.125 Assuming T had died on the actuarially
predicted date, T and his estate would have paid total transfer
taxes whose value, as of T's death, amounted to $35.20-advanta-
geous by comparison with the $40 estate tax paid in Example 1.126
If, however, section 2035(c) were applied without regard to
whether the gift was made during the three years preceding T's
death, T's taxable estate would include not only the $28 but also
the $12 gift tax paid on creation of the remainder, as depicted in
Example 3.127 Bearing in mind that, in nominal terms, section
121 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
122 The assumption that the income from the $28 is expended and that the principal is
preserved for transmission is admittedly arbitrary. It is consistent, however, with the origi-
nal premise that T wished to expend income but was willing to preserve principal. The
arbitrary nature of the assumption is addressed at a later point in the analysis, see infra
notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
223 I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1982), discussed supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text,
would bring the trust corpus into T's estate at its date-of-death value of $60.
124 LR.C. § 2035(c) (1982), discussed supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
125 As a technical matter, this result would be reached via the "adjusted taxable gifts"
rule of I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1982), discussed supra note 4. The "adjusted taxable gifts" rule
requires computation of a "tentative tax" on the sum of the gift tax value of the lifetime gift
in Example 3, $30, plus the $28 taxable estate, or a total of $58. Tax on this amount at 40%
is $23.20, from which there is subtracted the gift of $12 already paid in Example 3.
126 See supra text following note 28. Here, the $12 gift tax has a date-of-death value of
$24, see supra note 72 and accompanying text, which, when added to estate tax of $11.20,
yields total taxes with a date-of-death value of $35.20. The total taxes have a value dis-
counted to the date of the gift of $17.60. See supra note 70.
127 In its existing form, I.R.C. § 2035(c) (1982) is limited in its application to the tax on
gifts made within three years before death. Note that § 2035(c) brings the gift tax, but not
the lifetime gift, into T's taxable estate. In contrast, I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1982), illustrated in
Example 4, brings the lifetime gift (at its date-of-death value), but not the tax, into T's
1984]
The University of Chicago Law Review
2035(c) "unifies" the gift and estate tax bases, 28 we may test how
well it accomplishes that objective, and renders unnecessary rules
like that of section 2036(a)(1), by assuming for purposes of Exam-
ple 5 that no special estate tax provision other than section
2035(c) applies.
Example 5
T's taxable estate now is $40-assets of $28 included in the
estate plus the gift tax of $12 drawn into the estate by section
2035(c)-the tax on which, at 40%, is $16. T's estate after tax
is $12-assets of $28 minus estate tax of $16.11'
T and his estate now have paid total transfer taxes having a
nominal (or undiscounted) value of $28-the gift tax of $12 (in Ex-
ample 3) plus the estate tax of $16 (in Example 5). But, as we have
noted, the values of the taxes must be adjusted to take account of
the fact that the $12 gift tax is the equivalent of a $24 tax at T's
death. 130 As the result of this adjustment, the date-of-death value
of the total gift and estate taxes rises to $40. Hence, the simple
operation of restoring the gift tax paid to T's taxable estate brings
the value of the total taxes into line with the $40 estate tax actu-
ally paid in Example 1.1s1
This outcome suggests that section 2035(c), if applied gener-
ally to the gift tax in respect of all lifetime transfers subject to
retained life interests, would rectify the consequence of the differ-
ence between the gift and estate tax bases, and thereby would
eliminate any remaining tax advantage to the lifetime creation of
remainders of the sort depicted in Example 3. So understood, and
as thus amended, section 2035(c) might well justify repeal of sec-
tion 2036(a) (1).132
Before drawing that inference, however, we should examine
the alternative of taxing such transfers when made in a manner
consistent with the taxation of estates, rather than equalizing the
treatment at T's death. To do so we must modify Example 3 by
"grossing-up" the gift tax value of the lifetime creation of the
estate.
128 See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
129 Once again, this result is arrived at as a technical matter by way of the "adjusted
taxable gifts" rule of I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1982), discussed supra note 4.
130 See supra text accompanying note 72.
231 See supra text following note 28; Isenbergh, supra note 84, at 14-16. The signifi-
cance of the $12 remaining in T's estate is examined infra notes 143-56 and accompanying
text.
132 See Isenbergh, supra note 84 at 14-16 (proposing repeal of § 2036(a)(1)).
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remainder. The adjustment appropriate to a 40% tax rate calls for
multiplying the nominal gift by 1/.6, or 1.667.' ss The gift tax value
of the remainder created in Example 3 is $30, the discounted value
of the right to receive $60 on the anticipated date of T's death.134
Example 6
Although T's remainder is valued at $30, it now has an
adjusted (or "grossed-up") value for gift tax purposes of
$30 x 1.667, or $50. When taxed at 40%, the gift tax now is
$20.
On our discounting assumptions, the $50 "grossed-up" gift tax
value of the remainder is simply the discounted equivalent of T's
$100 taxable estate in Example 1.185 The $20 gift tax is the
equivalent of the $40 tax actually imposed on that estate.
Example 6, however, is simply the counterpart to Example 3,
modified to depict grossed-up taxation of the creation of the re-
mainder. Still missing from the analysis is a counterpart to Exam-
ple 5, tracing matters through to their culmination at T's death.
For the events in Example 6, like those in Example 3, did not en-
tirely deplete T's wealth. In Example 3, T was left with $28. Here
he is left with $20."16
Assume, to be consistent with Example 5, that the $20 remain-
ing principal passed to T's estate at his death.'37 As with section
2035(c), the operation of the gross-up approach may be tested on
the hypothesis that section 2036(a)(1) is unnecessary. ' Moreover,
since grossed-up taxation operates to tax the gift tax as well, in
this instance it is unnecessary to include the $20 gift tax in T's
estate. Therefore, section 2035(c) also may be hypothesized to be
unnecessary. Only the $20 actually in T's possession at his death
need be included in his estate.
Example 7
The tax on T's $20 estate at 40% is now $8. T's estate after
tax is $20 - $8, or $12.13 9
The undiscounted sum of the gift and estate tax liabilities in
133 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
'36 After creation of a remainder in $60 and payment of a $20 gift tax, T has
($100 - $60) - $20 = $20.
" See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
13s See supra text following note 128.
,39 See supra note 129.
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Examples 6 and 7, which exemplify the operation of grossed-up
taxation, is $28, just as it was in Examples 3 and 5, which together
exemplify the operation of section 2035(c). 140 But the timing of the
mix of payments differs. Under the gross-up approach the gift tax
is $20 (rather than $12), offset by the fact that the estate tax is $8
(rather than $16).
This timing change alters the financial value of the taxes. The
date-of-death value of the specific combination of gift and estate
taxes produced by Examples 3 and 5 was $40.141 The different mix
of payments in Examples 6 and 7 produces taxes with a total date-
of-death value of $48,142 exceeding by $8 the $40 estate tax actually
paid in Example 1. The outcome under section 2035(c), as illus-
trated by Examples 3 and 5, still seems more consistent with sim-
ple estate taxation.
Nevertheless, grossed-up taxation is demonstrably preferable.
On further analysis, the simple case of Example 1, in which T left
$100 to be taxed in his estate, is financially different from either
pair of examples in which, by lifetime transfer, T created a remain-
der in assets equal to the anticipated after-tax value of his estate.
The difference turns on T's payment of the gift tax. Although per-
haps not immediately apparent, and although dependent on the
subsequent course of events, that payment can function to create
an incremental wealth transfer by T.
In Example 1, T's designated beneficiaries received $60 on T's
death, after payment of $40 of estate tax. When T created a re-
mainder by lifetime gift-regardless of whether that transfer was
taxed as it would be under existing law (Example 3) or through
grossed-up taxation (Example 6)-the remainder alone was due to
provide $60 to T's beneficiaries at his death.143 Both examples 5
and 7 then illustrate that, at T's death, additional value passed
from T's estate to his beneficiaries.
In Example 7, T's estate was left with $20.144 After payment of
$8 in estate tax, T's beneficiaries received (assuming T so directed)
$12, in addition to the $60 remainder. Thus, in lieu of the simple
$60 estate after tax in Example 1, the date-of-death value of the
total after-tax wealth transfer produced by Examples 6 and 7 adds
140 This result is exactly what one would expect. See supra text accompanying notes
109-11.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
142 The date-of-death value of the $20 gift tax is $40, see supra note 70, to which must
be added the $8 estate tax, yielding $48.
142 See supra text following note 71.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
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up to $72. As we have already noted, the date-of-death value of the
total gift and estate taxes is $48.
In Example 5, $28 was left to T's estate. For tax purposes,
however, section 2035(c) also brought into the estate the $12 gift
tax, with the result that the estate tax, at 40%, was $16.145 Once
again T's estate after tax was $12. Thus, the pattern of Examples 3
and 5, like that of Examples 6 and 7, also operates to transmit a
total of $72 to T's designated beneficiaries. In Examples 3 and 5,
however, the date-of-death value of the total transfer taxes is only
$40.146
Assuming a 40% tax rate, taxes having a date-of-death value
of $48 are consistent with aggregate pre-tax wealth transfers hav-
ing a date-of-death value of $120-$20 more than the $100 taxable
estate in Example 1. The resulting after-tax wealth transfer should
be $120 minus $48, or $72. These values correspond precisely with
the date-of-death value of the sum of what T's beneficiaries receive
from, and what the government takes by taxation of, a combina-
tion of the remainder created by lifetime gift (Example 6) and T's
estate at death (Example 7).
By comparison, one way of looking at Examples 3 and 5 is that
the effective tax rate on the aggregate wealth transferred to T's
beneficiaries has declined. The date-of-death value of the total
taxes ($40), expressed as a percentage of the date-of-death value of
the sum of the transfers plus taxes ($72 plus $40, or $112),147 yields
an effective, tax-inclusive transfer tax rate of only 35.7%, even
though the nominal tax rate is 40%. Under grossed-up taxation,
the effective rate remains equal to the 40% nominal rate.
Another way of viewing the events depicted in Examples 3 and
5 is that, given a 40% tax rate, the payment of transfer taxes hav-
ing a date-of-death value of $40 is consistent with T's having made
pre-tax wealth transfers with a date-of-death value of $100. How-
ever, the $72 that actually passed to T's beneficiaries is consistent
with T's having made pre-tax wealth transfers with a date-of-death
value of $120.148 Under this view, the pre-tax equivalent of $20
passed untaxed to T's beneficiaries by reason of the method of
taxation illustrated in Examples 3 and 5. Appendix A suggests that
this latter interpretation is the more useful.14
145 See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
1'46 See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
147 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
'4' See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text; text following note 146.
14, See infra Appendix A, at 79-80, 83-84.
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One might inquire how T managed to make pre-tax wealth
transfers totalling $120 when he commenced this exercise with only
$100. The answer begins with the recognition that a pre-tax trans-
fer of $100 on the actuarially expected date of Ts death has a
value, on the discounting assumptions we have been using, of only
$50 on the date of the lifetime gift. The difference, or $50, is the
discounted value of T's right to the income from $100 in the in-
terim.150 The combination of these two interests entirely accounts
for the value of having $100 now. When viewed from the date of
T's death, instead of from the present, the income interest and the
remainder interest each has a value of $100. Their aggregate future
value-the future value of having $100 now-adds up to $200.151
If we tax lifetime transfers and transfers at death identically,
the government should (to use our simplifying assumption about
rates) take 40% of the tax-inclusive value of whatever T transfers
whenever and however he transfers it. 15 2 It should take nothing of
150 If, as an analytical matter, the value of having $100 today may be conceived of as
consisting of the present value of the right to dispose of that $100 at some future date plus
the present value of the right to receive income from $100 in the interim, and if the present
value of the right to dispose of the $100 in the future is [$100] [1/1 + )], see supra note
70, then
$100 PVI + [$100] [1/(l + i)n],
PV I = $100 - [$100] [1(1 + i)f], and
PV + [$1001 [1 - 1(1 + i9l,
where PV, is the present value of the income interest. See Appendix A, at 76.
On the discounting assumptions we are using, the present value of $100 to be received
at T2s anticipated death is $100( ) = $50. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The
present value of the right to the income in the interim, therefore, is $100 (1 - 1/2) = $50.
151 See supra text accompanying note 119.
152 This proposition, especially in light of the considerations set out supra, text accom-
panying notes 114-19, implies that, whatever the merits of the competing technical argu-
ments, the decision in United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 634 (1966) (income accumu-
lated and added to the corpus of an irrevocable trust treated as having been "transferred"
by the grantor/trustee and therefore includable in his gross estate), was soundly conceived,
at least under the existing system.
The proposition might be regarded as a refinement of what Professor Gutman has ad-
vanced as a "normative principle" of wealth transfer taxation, which would tax all wealth
transfers at a predetermined rate. See Gutman, supra note 6, at 1216-18. The refinement is
in the demonstration (rather than the assertion) that, to achieve consistency, the gift tax
base must be fixed on a consistent basis with the estate tax base at the time the gift is
made.
It is important to recognize, however, that the fundamental objective is consistency.
Altering the gift tax base to conform it to the estate tax base, in contrast, is simply a matter
of convention. At least in theory, consistency could as readily be achieved by eliminating
the transfer tax from the estate tax base. For a given array of nominal transfer tax rates the
choice between one method or the other of achieving consistency is essentially a choice be-
tween one set of effective rates and another.
But then, under either approach, effective rates could be fixed at whatever level is con-
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what T chooses to retain. Thus, when T elected to live off the
income from $100 and to leave $100 at his death, as depicted in
Example 1, in effect he chose to retain half the value-the "in-
come" half-attributable to having $100 in hand at the time he
made that decision. The remaining $100 of principal, ultimately
due to be transferred, was also ultimately due to be taxed. What is
more, since T elected to consume the "income half," the burden of
the tax was destined to fall on the "remainder" half of the value
attributable to having $100 now. That "remainder" half has a pre-
sent value of $50, and a value at the time it is expected to pass to
T's estate of $100, leaving $60 (after tax at 40%) for T's
beneficiaries.
When, instead, T chose to create the remainder by lifetime
transfer and to pay the transfer tax himself, he paved the way for
shifting the incidence of the tax. Instead of the tax being paid by
T's estate, thereby depleting the wealth that passed to T's benefi-
ciaries after estate tax, its discounted equivalent was paid as gift
tax by T. That payment, in contrast with the creation of the re-
mainder, actually depleted T's wealth, thereby reducing the value
of the income T could expect to receive during the balance of his
life.15s
By substituting a gift tax payment for an equivalent estate tax
payment, of course, T only potentially shifted the burden of the
transfer tax to himself. He still retained the option of taking subse-
quent steps to offset his payment of the gift tax. Assuming that the
lifetime creation of the remainder had attracted gift tax of $20
under the gross-up approach of Example 6, T could have compen-
sated for his payment of the tax by thereafter consuming the $20
of principal that remained in his possession.'" But when T elected
instead to restrict future consumption to his remaining income, he
completed an incremental transfer of wealth. He actually sacri-
ficed, in favor of his beneficiaries, the right to receive the income
sidered to be appropriate by the simple expedient of readjusting the nominal rates.
15 Of itself, the voluntary creation of the remainder does not require T to forego any
value attributable to the income from his wealth. But payment of the gift tax associated
with the creation of the remainder actually depletes T's income-producing principal.
I' The assets remaining in T's possession after creation of the remainder and payment
of the tax, on the assumption that creation of the remainder was taxed as illustrated in
Example 6, would have been $20. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. If T had
elected to expend the entire $20 for consumption, no assets would have passed to T's estate
at his death and no further transfer tax would have been due. Cf. supra text accompanying
notes 137-39. As a result, only the $60 remainder would pass to T's beneficiaries at his
death, and only a $20 gift tax-the equivalent of a $40 tax paid at death, see supra note
70-would have been paid. The net effect would be the same as it was in Example 1.
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from the $20 paid as tax for the duration of his expected remaining
life. That sacrifice accounts for the additional wealth transfer that
materialized in Example 7.
One can readily specify the value of the income interest T
gave up by his election. On the assumptions used throughout this
discussion, that interest has a discounted value of $10 and a value
as of T's death of $20.155 The latter corresponds exactly with the
incremental pre-tax wealth transfer that appeared as T's taxable
estate in Example 7, at least when T's creation of the remainder
was taxed under the gross-up approach as illustrated in Example 6.
Much the same thing occurs under section 2035(c), as illus-
trated by Examples 3 and 5. In that instance, however, the govern-
ment foregoes collecting a part of the tax until T dies. As it hap-
pens, this deferral exactly offsets the additional tax that otherwise
would be imposed on the additional wealth transfer through T's
estate.156 The implication of these examples is that, under the
15 The present value of the foregone right to the income from $20 for T's life is
$20(1 - V2) = $10. See supra note 150. The value at T's death of something worth $10 now
is $10 x 2 = $20. See supra note 70.
From a different perspective, T, before taking any action, possessed $100, the income
interest in which for T's life has a discounted value of $50 and a date-of-death value of $100.
After creation of the remainder and payment of $20 in gift tax, T was left with an income
interest in a $60 trust plus $20 in cash. If T elected to consume only the income from the
$20 plus the income from the trust, T would be left with an income interest in $80 having a
discounted value of $40 and a date-of-death value of $80. "
"' The value of the deferral is the value of an income interest for T's expected remain-
ing life in the portion of the tax that is deferred. See supra note 150, and Appendix A, at 85.
That value, as it happens, exactly offsets the tax that would be imposed on a wealth transfer
equal in value to an income interest in the incremental tax that would have been imposed
through "grossed-up" taxation of the transfer in the first place. See Appendix A, at 84-85.
Note that, as in the case of "grossed-up" taxation of the remainder, T may compensate
for his having paid the gift tax by subsequently expending principal for consumption. See
supra note 154. If taxed under § 2035(c), however, T, by subsequent consumption of all
remaining principal, could more than offset the value of the income interest foregone
through payment of the tax.
After payment of the $12 gift tax, T would be left with the right to income from the $60
in trust plus $28 in cash. See supra text following note 121. These items have an aggregate
discounted value of $58. See supra notes 74, 82. The only constraint on T's consumption is
that he ought to conserve sufficient cash to allow his estate to satisfy the tax liability at-
tracted by inclusion in his estate of (1) the $12 gift tax (under § 2035(c)), plus (2) the cash
left to the estate. Thus, T should leave $8 to his estate. See supra note 77 and accompany-
ing text.
If T does so, T still will be able to expend for consumption an income interest in
$68-the income from the trust plus the income from the $8 that he leaves to his es-
tate-which has a discounted value of $34, see supra note 150, plus $20 ($28 - $8) in cash,
or total value of $54. Thus, even though T's beneficiaries receive $60 at Ts death, as they
did in Example 1, T is better off in the interim. In other words, § 2035(c) effectively would
permit T to provide for transmission to his beneficiaries, at lower tax cost, of the same $60
as in Example 1, leaving T to consume more in the interim. See supra note 74 and accompa-
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gross-up approach to taxation of lifetime gifts, the incremental
wealth transfer created by T's foregoing the income on the gift tax
payment is itself taxed (on a tax-inclusive basis) at the 40% trans-
fer tax rate, accounting for the additional $8 of estate tax. By con-
trast, taxing the gift as under current law and postponing until
death the inclusion of the gift tax in the transfer tax base-thereby
deferring a portion of the tax on the lifetime gift-exempts the
incremental transfer from tax.157
These inferences are not the fortuitous result of the numerical
assumptions adopted in the examples. Appendix A makes the same
comparisons in general terms, and demonstrates that the results
hold for other tax rates and discounting assumptions. Regardless
of the value of the assets in which a remainder is created by life-
time transfer, where creation of the remainder operates to transfer
more than the anticipated after-tax value of the transferor's estate,
the gross-up approach taxes the incremental transfer.158 Section
2035(c), in contrast, yields taxes with a combined value that usu-
ally equals, and never exceeds, the estate tax that would have been
paid in the absence of the lifetime transfer."5 ' In short, when ap-
nying text.
157 Compare this to a similar, and increasingly visible, phenomenon under the income
tax: the tax deferral resulting from the allowance of a current deduction for the cost of
making an income-producing investment operates to exempt from tax the income subse-
quently derived from that investment. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see, for exam-
ple, Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REv.
1113, 1127 (1974); Surrey, The Tax Reform Act of 1969 - Tax Deferral and Tax Shelters,
12 B. C. INDus. & CoM. L. REV. 307, 313 (1971).
'1 The algebraic exposition in Appendix A indicates that T can create a remainder
interest in assets in an amount that exceeds his estate after tax in Example 1 (i.e., $60).
Under grossed-up gift taxation his ability to do so is limited only by the fact that the sum of
the assets in which the remainder is created, plus the resulting gift tax, may not exceed
$100. On the assumptions we have been using, T could create a remainder interest
in at most $75. See Appendix A, at 80-81. The gift tax value of the remainder would
be $37.50. See supra note 70. If grossed-up for a 40% tax rate, the "taxable" gift of
$37.50 x 1.667 = $62.50, see supra note 99 and accompanying text, the tax on which is $25.
Creation of the remainder and payment of tax thus entirely account for T's $100. Note that
the tax ($25) is 40% of the aggregate tax and transfer ($37.50 + $25 = $62.50).
159 Appendix A demonstrates that, under § 2035(c), T also may create a remainder in as
much as $75. Cf. supra note 158. Under that regime, T's ability to create a remainder in
more than $60 is limited by the need for T to retain sufficient free cash so that his estate
can pay the tax on the sum of (1) the gift tax drawn into his estate under section 2035(c),
plus (2) the cash retained to pay the tax. See Appendix A, at 86-87; see also supra note 77.
The gift tax value of a remainder in the maximum of $75 would again be $37.50, and
the gift tax, at 40%, would be $15, leaving T, after creation of the remainder and payment
of the gift tax, with $100 - $75 - $15 = $10. Inclusion in T's estate of that $10 together
with the gift tax of $15 would create a taxable estate of $25, the tax on which would be $10.
See supra note 129. Note that the date-of-death value of the total transfer taxes is, as in
Examples 3 and 5, $40, consisting of the date-of-death value of the $15 gift tax ($30) plus
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plied to lifetime transfers with retained life interests, the approach
advocated by the Treasury in 1969 would tax lifetime gifts consist-
ently with existing taxation of transfers at death. Section 2035(c)
does not.
B. Outright Gifts
As applied to lifetime transfers with retained life interests, the
consequence of the choice between grossed-up gift taxation and
generalizing section 2035(c), once identified, is fairly dramatic. The
implications of the choice for outright gifts are more readily dis-
cernible if slightly less striking.
Once again, the difference can be illustrated by example. Only
one assumption need be changed. Since by hypothesis T is willing
to make an outright gift, we now may assume that he is willing to
forego in favor of his beneficiaries the entire value of the $100 in
his possession. Under grossed-up taxation, T could give his benefi-
ciaries only $60.
Example 8
The nominal value of Ts gift is $60. The adjustment called
for under the gross-up approach would require it to be multi-
plied by 1.667, 0 yielding a "taxable" gift of $100, the tax on
which, at 40%, would be $40. The combined gift and gift tax
entirely absorb T's $100.
By contrast, under section 2035(c), no adjustment would be
required at the time the $60 gift is made. As in Example 2, the gift
tax would be $24. After making the gift and paying the tax, T
would be left with $16. On our revised assumption, however, T now
should be willing to sequester all value attributable to this $16 and
apply it to further transfers to his beneficiaries. In other words, we
may assume that T will accumulate the income from this $16 while
he is alive and will leave the principal plus accumulated income to
his beneficiaries when he dies.
The $16 will, under our assumptions, be worth $32 at T's
death,161 and that amount will be included in Ts taxable estate.
the estate tax ($10). See supra note 70.
The date-of-death value of the total taxes will amount to $40 for the creation of a life-
time remainder in any amount between $60 and $75. See Appendix A, at 87-88. Thus, re-
gardless of the actual size of the transfer, the tax imposed remains consistent with the trans-
mission of a $100 estate.
160 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 70.
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Under section 2035(c), T's estate for tax purposes also will include
the $24 gift tax paid."'2
Example 9
T now has a taxable estate of $56. The estate tax, at 40%, is
$22.40. T's estate after tax is $32 - $22.40, or $9.60.163
In this instance T is able to make wealth transfers having an
aggregate present value of $64.80, consisting of the sum of the $60
lifetime gift, plus the discounted value of T's $9.60 estate after tax,
or $4.80.11" Under a consistent scheme of tax-inclusive wealth-
transfer taxation, the tax associated with an after-tax wealth trans-
fer of $64.80 should be $43.20.165 But the taxes actually paid have a
combined present value of only $35.20-the sum of $24 of gift tax
plus an estate tax of $22.40, the present value of which is $11.20.
One interpretation of these results is that an after-tax wealth
transfer of $64.80 is consistent, conceptually, with T's having made
pre-tax wealth transfers of $108, the tax on which ought to be
$43.20.116 By contrast, the total tax actually paid is consistent with
T's having made pre-tax wealth transfers of only $88 (the tax on
which would be $35.20). On this view, the pre-tax equivalent of $20
again was transmitted untaxed. A second interpretation is that, de-
spite the 40% nominal rate, the effective tax rate on T's aggregate
transfers is only 35.2% ($35.20/$100). In either event, the present
value of the sum of what Ts beneficiaries receive in Examples 2
and 9 is $4.80 more, and what the government takes in tax is $4.80
less, than their respective shares in Example 8.
Once again, the approach proposed by the Treasury in 1969
operates unremittingly to subject wealth transfers of comparable
size to consistent taxation. In contrast, section 2035(c) confers a
continuing advantage on the use of lifetime gifts. It does not truly
equalize the gift and estate tax bases, and it does not actually
unify the taxes themselves.
162 Assuming, once again, that § 2035(c) were to be applied without regard to the three-
year limitation of existing law. See supra note 127.
11 See supra note 129.
1 See supra note 70.
16 That is, to be taxed on a tax-inclusive basis, the $64.80 after-tax transfer would have
to be grossed-up for a 40% rate, yielding an adjusted gift of $64.80 x 1.6667 = $108. See
supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. The tax on $108 at 40% would be $43.20.
"' See supra note 165.
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V. PRACTICABILITY OF THE GROSS-UP APPROACH
What remains to be determined is whether the Treasury ap-
proach is practicable. Section 2035(c) appears to create little diffi-
culty in administration. At death, the decedent's personal repre-
sentative simply must ascertain the amount of gift taxes paid with
respect to transfers during the three preceeding years, and add
that to whatever else is includable in the decedent's estate. Ex-
tending this rule to include the tax on all prior taxable gifts would
present little additional difficulty. The application of the post-1976
unified rate schedule to the cumulative total of taxable gifts plus
the decedent's estate already requires the personal representative
to ascertain the amount of the decedent's "adjusted taxable gifts,"
defined to include post-1976 taxable transfers whether or not tax
was actually required to be paid.167 Acquisition of this information,
typically from gift tax returns, necessarily would carry with it the
amount of gift taxes actually paid by the decedent, thereby fur-
nishing all the data needed to comply with section 2035(c).
Implementing a scheme of grossed-up taxation of lifetime gifts
when made would appear to be somewhat more complicated, at
least in a system involving graduated transfer tax rates. Indeed,
the Treasury Proposals were not, at least on the question of
mechanics, overly specific:
In addition to eliminating the dual rate base, the unified
transfer tax would further equate lifetime and deathtime
transfers by providing rules for computing the tax on lifetime
transfers so that, in effect, the tax is paid out of the property
transferred, as is the case with transfers at death. Thus, the
proposal provides for computation of the tax on lifetime
transfers by valuing the gift ("grossing-up" the gift) so as to
include the amount of the tax within the amount of the gift
upon which the tax is computed. A simplified table would be
available to compute the grossed-up transfer, so that taxpay-
ers would not be burdened by complex calculations."" 8
The difficulty with grossed-up taxation-perhaps accounting
for the vagueness and the slightly defensive reference to "complex
calculations"-is that, as we have already seen, the required ad-
justment to the gift varies with the nominal tax rate. This may be
17 See I.R.C. §§ 2001(b), 2503(a)-(b) (1982), discussed supra note 4. The limitation to
post-1976 taxable gifts reflects the prospective operation of this provision of the 1976 Act.
1" TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 355, reprinted in 1976 ST"F MATERLLLS,
supra note 3, at 255.
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illustrated by reconsidering algebraically a contemplated wealth
transfer of a pre-tax amount E. If taxed at rate t in a decedent's
estate, the tax would be tE and the estate after tax would be
E - tE, or E(1 - t). A comparable transfer by lifetime gift would
start with the net private transfer of E(1 - t), also to be taxed at
rate t. To arrive at a tax liability of tE, as with taxation in an
estate, the net private transfer must be divided by (1 - t). 169
When the tax rate t changes, as it will in a graduated tax system,
the value of (1 - t) also will change. 170 This alteration as a func-
tion of nominal transfer tax rates is one principal source of possi-
bly "complex calculations."
A second complication is that the points at which successive
alterations in the gross-up adjustment occur do not correspond
with the nominal graduation points on the estate tax rate table.
This second difficulty can be illustrated by considering a simplified
set of estate tax rates that taxes the first $100 of taxable estate at
20% and taxes transfers in excess of $100 at 40%. A $50 transfer
taxed at 20% in an estate would attract a tax of $10, leaving $40
after tax. A $40 lifetime gift, also to be taxed at 20%, would be
multiplied by 1/(1 - .2), or 1.25, yielding a "grossed-up" taxable
gift of $50, the tax on which, at 20%, would also be $10. If taxed at
the 40% rate, a $50 transfer at death would incur tax of $20, leav-
ing $30 after tax; and the corresponding $30 gift would (as we have
repeatedly seen) be multiplied by 1.667, again yielding a grossed-
up tax base of $50 and now attracting a gift tax of $20.
Suppose, however, that having made no prior taxable trans-
fers, an individual makes a lifetime gift of $90. The transfer is less
than $100, and apparently should be adjusted for a 20% tax rate
by multiplying it by 1.25. But that operation gives rise to a
grossed-up, "taxable" gift of $90 x 1.25, or $112.50, thereby carry-
ing the gift into the 40% bracket in which a different adjustment,
multiplication by 1.667, is called for. It is evident that the point of
graduation in our simplified set of estate tax rates-$100-assumes
that the tax base to which the rates will be applied is, like the
estate tax, tax-inclusive. The graduation point takes into account
both the value of the private wealth transfer and the tax to be
imposed on the transfer. Since, in contrast, the gift tax is com-
puted by applying graduated rates to net private transfers, exclud-
ing the tax, the corresponding point of graduation-and the place
at which the gross-up adjustment changes-falls elsewhere. Some-
"' See supra note 99.
,,0 See supra note 94; C. SHOUP, supra note 3, at 16-17.
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how, the gift tax brackets must implicitly take the amount of the
transfer tax into account in determining when the "real" point of
graduation, determined by reference to the tax-inclusive estate tax
rate schedule, has been reached.
In the simple example under consideration, that point occurs
at $80. Multiplication of the first $80 of the $90 gift by 1.25 yields
a "taxable" gift of $100 and a gift tax of $20. The sum of the actual
gift plus the gift tax now equals $100. In terms of the tax-inclusive
estate tax rate schedule, the next marginal bracket has been
reached. The remaining $10 gift is taxed at 40%, after having been
multiplied by 1.667, resulting in additional gift tax of
$10 x 1.667 x .4, or $6.67.
The $90 gift attracts total tax of $26.67. In other words, the
total pre-tax wealth transfer is $116.67.111 That amount, if taxed in
the transferor's estate under the hypothesized set of estate tax
rates, would also attract $26.67 in tax. 72 The after-tax transfer
again would be $90.
These two problems, however, point to a simple solution.
While much of the discussion about unification of the transfer
taxes contemplates "grossing-up" gifts for tax purposes,173 the sim-
ple fact is that a tax is always the product of a base and a rate. It
is equally feasible to achieve, consistency in taxing lifetime gifts by
grossing-up the (tax-inclusive) estate tax rates. Doing so would
create a nominally different-but in reality identical-set of gift
tax rates which then could be applied to lifetime gifts without the
need for any mechanical adjustment to the amount of the gift.
What is more, the brackets on the transformed table of tax-exclu-
sive gift tax rates could be fixed so as to ensure that the gradua-
tions in the rates occurred at those values of net private transfer
corresponding to the graduation points on the tax-inclusive estate
tax rate table.
In terms of our simple example-with the addition of an inter-
mediate 30% bracket to fill out the illustration-the estate tax
rate table and corresponding gift tax rate table would be as
follows:
1I See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
1712 The first $100 of the transfer would attract a tax, at 20%, of $20, while the $16.67
balance of the transfer would attract a tax, at 40%, of $6.67.
17 See, e.g., TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 369, reprinted in 1976 STAFF
MATERALs, supra note 3, at 269; C. SHouP, supra note 3, at 16-17.
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ESTATE TAX
TOTAL OF ADJUSTED TAXABLE
GIFTS, GIFT TAXES PAID,
AND TAXABLE ESTATE TENTATIVE TAX 17 4
0 to $100
$101 to $200
More than $200
TOTAL OF ADJUSTED
TAXABLE GIFTS
0 to$ 80
$81 to $150
More than $150
20% of the total
$20 plus 30% of the total in
excess of $100
$50 plus 40% of the total in
excess of $200
GIFT TAX
TENTATIVE TAX
25% of the adjusted taxable
gifts
$20 plus 43% of the adjusted
taxable gifts in excess of $80
$50 plus 67% of the adjusted
taxable gifts in excess of $150
A test of the operation of these tables can be carried out by
comparing the tax imposed on an estate of $500 with the gift tax
imposed on a taxable gift that corresponds with the resulting es-
tate after tax. Applying the rates set out in the Estate Tax table,
the tax on a $500 estate is $170, leaving an estate after tax of
$330.17 Under the Gift Tax table, the tax associated with a $330
taxable gift is also $170.171 Identical tax liabilities would be at-
tracted for any combination of lifetime gifts and transfers at death
in between.
Appendix B contains both an algebraic derivation of the
brackets on a transformed gift tax rate schedule, and a gift tax rate
schedule corresponding with the existing unified rate schedule as it
will look when the rate reductions prescribed by the 1981 Act are
fully phased in.17
174 As under existing law, see I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1982), discussed supra note 4, the sum
of the taxes paid on prior lifetime transfers would be subtracted from the "tentative tax" to
arrive at the estate tax actually due.
1 75 Under the Estate Tax table, tax on the first $200 would be $50, and tax on the
remaining $300, at 40%, would be $120, yielding a total tax of $170.
176 Under the Gift Tax table, tax on the first $150 would be $50, and tax on the remain-
ing $180, at 67%, would be $120, yielding a total tax of $170.
7 See supra note 12 for a discussion of the rates instituted by the 1981 Act.
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Once it is recognized that a transformed rate schedule can be
devised that automatically taxes lifetime gifts on a grossed-up
basis, the remaining mechanics are fairly simple. In computing the
place at which the decedent's taxable estate falls on the graduated
estate tax rate table, the executor need only ascertain the total of
the decedent's taxable lifetime gifts (computation of which is re-
quired by existing law) plus the gift taxes paid (computation of
which would be needed to comply with section 2035(c)) and add
the sum of these items to whatever else is included in the dece-
dent's estate. In reality, then, implementation of a fully unified
transfer tax based on grossed-up taxation of lifetime gifts would be
no more complicated than applying a generalized version of section
2035(c).
There does exist one final complication in the taxation of life-
time gifts consistently with the taxation of estates that cannot be
remedied simply in any graduated system of transfer taxation. It
stems from the fact that while present and future transfers may be
set equal to one another by the process of discounting, the points
of graduation on a rate table are fixed in nominal amounts. Conse-
quently, where tax rates are graduated, a single table of rates can-
not achieve complete consistency in taxing transfers that, although
of identical present value, are made at different times and there-
fore have different nominal values. 78
This phenomenon can be observed using the simple rate tables
set out in the text above. Suppose that T has $100 now, and that
this $100, if allowed to accumulate interest, is expected to be worth
$200 as of the actuarially expected date of T's death. If it were left
to accumulate and ultimately were taxed in T's estate, the $200
transfer would attract estate tax, given the rates fixed by the Es-
tate Tax table, of $50, leaving $150 for T's beneficiaries. The pre-
sent value of the tax and transfer, on the discounting assumptions
used throughout this article,7 9 would be $25 and $75, respectively.
If, instead, T were willing to part with his $100 now, he could make
a gift of $80. The gift tax would be $20 and the sum of the gift plus
the tax would be $100. The tax associated with a current transfer
is $5 less than the present value of the tax associated with an
equivalent transfer at death. Consequently, the value of the after-
tax transfer is $5 more.
In both instances the transfers have identical pre-tax present
values. Moreover, the Gift and Estate Tax tables above have been
178 See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 70.
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fashioned so as to achieve consistent taxation of lifetime transfers
and transfers at death. But the use of a lifetime gift has operated
to attract tax to a transfer having a lower nominal value ($100
rather than $200) and the tax rates are graduated in nominal
terms. Consequently, a greater portion of the lifetime gift is taxed
in a lower transfer tax bracket. This "bracket effect" is not, so far
as I can tell, easily remedied if it is remediable at all. In any event,
the advantage it confers under existing transfer tax rates is not
more than approximately $400,000.180 The costs in complexity nec-
essary to eliminate this final obstacle to perfect consistency are
probably not worth whatever might be gained.
CONCLUSION
Two points emerge from this analysis. First, with one qualifi-
cation, neutrality in the taxation of gratuitous wealth transfers by
gift and at death can be achieved through "grossed-up" taxation of
gifts. The rule currently embodied in section 2035(c) does not ac-
complish that objective. Second, no significant complexity need be
involved in implementing a system of grossed-up taxation. What is
more, it is likely that substantial gains in simplification of the gift
and estate taxes would be made possible if we were to tax lifetime
gifts and transfers at death in a fashion that is consistent.181 Alto-
gether, enactment of a system of grossed-up gift taxation would be
a welcome revision to our wealth transfer taxes.
,so See Isenbergh, supra note 84, at 13 & nn.48-51.
181 See supra note 152.
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APPENDIX A
Considered below are various ways in which an individual, T, whose
expected remaining life is n years, might dispose of wealth E to private
beneficiaries. T's options include present transfers and transfers at death.
Where T is comparing options that involve present transfers with those
involving transfers at death, values will be placed on a consistent footing
by reducing future transactions to present value or extending present
transactions to future value.
Given a discount rate i and assuming periodic compounding for n
years, the value of X dollars with compound interest at some future date
is
FVx = X(1 + i)n.
Similarly, the discounted (or present) value of the right to receive X dol-
lars n years in the future-that is, the present value of a remainder inter-
est in X to be received in n years-is
XPVx - (1 + i) n
It is assumed that X may be invested at i so as to earn interest annually
of iX. The present value of a remainder in X to be received after n years,
plus the present value of the right to the income from X during the inter-
vening n years, when added together, equal X. Thus
X
ad X = PVix + (I + i)"'
and
PVix = X I1- (1 +i)n
Since for any given discount rate (i) and number of years (n) the expres-
sion (1 + i)f is constant, in the balance of this Appendix D = (1 + i)n
and
FVx = XD, (1)x
PVx = -i , (2)
and
1
Finally, for simplicity of exposition, it is assumed the tax is imposed on
all private wealth transfers without exclusion at a noihinal rate t.
One of T's options is to live off the income from E during life, leaving
'E at death. That option (Case 1) will be considered first.
Under one alternative (Case 2), T will be assumed to make a present
transfer (for example, in trust) of some portion of his assets, reserving an
income interest for his life, remainder passing to designated beneficiaries.
The retained income interest is not a taxable transfer. The value of the
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remainder is equal to the assets transferred, discounted to present value
ov3r T's expected remaining life. The creation of the remainder is a taxa-
ble transfer and will be taxed at rate t. In Case 2 the transferred remain-
der will be taxed in the manner proposed by the Treasury in 1969, by
transforming the nominal transfer tax rate (t) as necessary to achieve tax-
ation of lifetime gifts, when made, in a manner consistent with the taxa-
tion of estates. Since the lifetime gift of the remainder is taxed when
made there will be no need to tax it again in T's estate. Consequently,
I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) is assumed to have been repealed. Since the effect of
taxing the gift consistently with the way it would be taxed at death is to
tax both the lifetime transfer and the tax on the transfer-that is, in ef-
fect to tax the gift on a tax-inclusive basis at rate t-the gift tax also will
be excluded from T's estate. Only the excess of T's original wealth (E)
over the sum of the assets in which T created the remainder plus the
amount of the gift tax paid will be taxed in T's estate.
In Case 2 it will be assumed initially that T creates a remainder in
assets equal to the anticipated value of his estate after tax in Case 1.
Since it will appear that, by making the lifetime gift, T in fact may in-
crease the amount of after-tax wealth passing to his beneficiaries, the
maximum amount that T may transfer, subject to a retained life interest,
will be described. Finally it will be shown that observations concerning
the special case in which T made a lifetime transfer equal to the origi-
nally anticipated after-tax value of his estate in Case 1 hold regardless of
the magnitude of the lifetime transfer.
In Case 3, as in Case 2, T will be assumed to make a present transfer
of a remainder, subject to a retained income interest for life. The remain-
der will be valued as it was in Case 2, but will be taxed as it would under
current law by imposing tax at the nominal transfer tax rate (t). Since, as
in Case 2, the remainder will have been taxed when created, the repeal of
section 2036(a)(1) again will be assumed and the assets in which the re-
mainder was created will be excluded from T's estate. Since, however, the
effect of taxing the lifetime gift as under current law is to forego taxing
the gift tax (as contrasted with the gift itself), the gift tax paid will be
included in T's estate at death. Thus, while the assets in T's estate will
consist of the excess of T's original wealth (E) over the sum of the assets
in which T created the remainder plus the amount of the gift tax paid,
T's taxable estate will include the amount of those assets plus the gift
tax.
As in Case 2, it initially will be assumed that T creates a remainder
in assets equal to the anticipated value of his estate after tax in Case 1.
The relationships between the outcomes in Cases 2 and 3, and their rela-
tionship to the outcome in Case 1, will be described. Then it will be
shown that in Case 2, as in Case 3, creating a remainder subject to an
income interest for life allows T (if he so desires) to make an additional
transfer to his beneficiaries, and that the maximum amount by which T
can increase the transfer (while retaining a life interest) is the same in
both cases. Finally, it will be shown that the relationships between the
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results in Cases 2 and 3 that appear in the special instance in which T
created a remainder in assets equal to his anticipated estate after tax in
Case 1 hold regardless of the amount in which T creates a remainder by
lifetime transfer.
Case 1: Taxation in T's Estate
If T lives off the income from E for life, his estate will equal
E, (4)
the estate tax will be
tE, (5)
and the amount passing to T's beneficiaries after tax will be E - tE, or
E(1 - t). (6)
The present value of the right to the income from E for T's life
equals (from 3)
1
PVx = E (1 -- .(7)
The present value of the estate tax equals (from 2, 5)
tEt(5a)
and the value of the estate after tax, similarly discounted (from 2, 6),
equals
ED (1 - t). (6a)
The sum of the present values of T's life interest in the income (7), the
anticipated estate tax (5a), and the anticipated estate after tax (6a), is E.
Finally, the estate tax liability, tE, expressed as a percentage not of
the taxable estate (E) but of the estate after tax (E - tE)-in other
words, as a percentage of the net transfer-is
tE t (8)
E (1 - t) (1 - 0)
This is the "grossed-up" tax rate corresponding to a nominal transfer tax
rate t, that is, it is the rate at which a net (tax-exclusive) transfer of
E(1 - t) must be taxed so as to yield tax equal to the tax at rate t on a
gross (tax-inclusive) transfer of E.
Case 2: Lifetime Transfer Taxed on a Grossed-Up Basis
In Case 2, T initially makes a current transfer of assets equal to his
anticipated estate after tax in Case 1, or E(1 - t) (6), reserving an in-
come interest in the assets for his life, and irrevocably vesting a remain-
der in his beneficiaries. The present value of E(1 - t) to be received by
the beneficiaries on the expected date of T's death is (from 2)
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E
D (1
also given by (6a). This is the value for gift tax purposes of the trans-
ferred remainder. When taxed at the grossed-up tax rate (8) the gift tax
liability is
(1- t) (I1 t) -D- (9)
Since the transferred remainder is simply the present value of the antici-
pated estate after tax (from Case 1), and since it has been taxed consist-
ently with the taxation at death of E at rate t, the gift tax liability equals
the present value of the anticipated estate tax liability in Case 1 (5a).
By incurring the gift tax associated with the current transfer, T has
depleted his initial wealth by LE. At death his estate for tax purposes is
reduced by this amount, and also by the value (as of T's death) of the
assets in which the remainder was created (date-of-gift value given by 6a,
date-of-death value given by 6). Thus, T's taxable estate (from 6, 9) is
tE 1
-E(1 U- 0) - - = E(1-- ),(10)
which, under the assumptions of Case 2, represents assets actually pass-
ing to T's estate. The tax on this amount at rate t is
tE (I -D
and T's estate after tax (10 minus 11 and factoring) is
1(I - t) tE (1 -- .(12)
Valued as of death, the total pre-tax transfer by T, which includes
the remainder created by gift (6a) valued at T's death (6), plus the gift
tax (9) also valued as of T's death (from 1, also given by 5), plus the
taxable estate (10), is
1 1
E(1 - t) + tE + tE(1 - D) =E + tE(1 - ). (13)
The aggregate transfer taxes paid, also valued as of T's death, which con-
sist of the gift tax (9) valued as of death (from 1, also given by 5) plus the
estate tax (11), is
1
tE + t2E (1 -- .(14)
The total after-tax transfer to private beneficiaries, valued as of death (13
minus 14), is
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tEBypaying gift tax of !, T in effect chose to forego the income from
those assets for his expected remaining life. The present value of that
income interest (from 3) is
tE 1
D ( - , (16)
which has a value as of T's death (from 1) of
1
tE (1 - 1) (17)
This equals the date-of-death value of the incremental pre-tax transfer
that appeared in (13), on which tax was paid at rate t (compare 14 with
5), yielding an incremental after-tax wealth transfer (from 15) of
1(1-t) tE (I -). (18)
In other words, by paying himself a part of the taxes ultimately to be
attracted by the transfer of his wealth, T gave up part of the value attrib-
utable to his initial possession of wealth of E; what T gave up was con-
verted into an incremental transfer to his beneficiaries, the incremental
wealth transfer was taxed at rate t, and the incremental wealth transfer
after tax actually passed to T's beneficiaries.
The presence of additional assets in T's estate (10), even after crea-
tion by lifetime transfer of a remainder in E(1 - t), implies that T could
have made a lifetime transfer subject to a retained income interest in an
amount greater than E(1 - t). If X is the additional amount in which a
remainder is created, the total value of the assets subject to the remain-
der would be E(1 - t) + X. If so, the value for gift tax purposes of the
remainder (from 2) would be
E (1 - t) + X (19)
D
the tax on which, at rate 1 , would be
tE tX
D D (1-t) (20)
T's taxable estate now would consist of his original wealth (E) minus the
assets in which the remainder (19) was created, valued as of T's death
(from 1), and minus the gift tax paid (20), or
E -[ (I- t + X -- + DIt) o°r
E-[E1~~)] - [ D+D (1-t)lr
tE _ tXtE-"D - - D (1 - t)'°
tE (1- -) - X 1 + D (1 _ t) " (21)
Suppose that T's desire was to maximize the amount in which,
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through a current transfer, he could create a remainder subject to an in-
come interest for his life. To do so (under the assumptions of Case 2) he
would create interests in an amount such that the gift tax on the cur-
rently transferred remainder (at rate , ' t), when added to the assets in
which the remainder was created, would reduce his taxable estate (21) to
zero. In that event
X +D t) =tE (1-).
Rearranging and factoring yields
X-- tE 1 D- D+ "(22)
As long as X is greater than zero and less than the value given by(22), T will leave some taxable estate (21) the tax on which (at rate t) will
be
t 2E (1 )-tX + D (1- t) or
[tE (1 - 1 - X + ( t1 (23)
and T's estate after tax (21 minus 23) will be
[1- t][t(1- I) - X 1 + D(-t) (24)
The total pre-tax transfer by T, valued as of T's death, consisting of
the sum of the date-of-death value of the remainder created by gift (from
19 and 1), the date-of-death value of the gift tax paid (from 20 and 1),
plus the taxable estate (21), is
[(1-t) +X] + [t +t B r(1- -1)--X + Dl-
Rearranging and factoring yields
1 tX (11
E+ tE(1- 1) + (1 t) 1D) (25)
The total tax paid by T and his estate, also valued as of T's death, con-
sisting of the sum of the gift tax (20) valued as of T's death (from 1), plus
the estate tax (23), rearranged and factored, is
t + tE(1- ) + (1t)(1--J, (26)
and the total transfer to private beneficiaries after tax (25 minus 26) is
- + E(I- ) I t (1 )] (27)
As before, creating a remainder in additional assets of X has led to
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tT's paying additional taxes, at rate 1 - t , on the present value of the ad-
ditional remainder , or D (1- t). By so doing, T elected to forego an in-
come interest for life in the amount of the additional gift tax paid. We
should (again from 3) expect the additional interest T has relinquished to
have a present value of
tX
D(1- t) (1 - ), (28)
and a value as of T's death (from 1) of
tX 1
(1 - t) (1 -D ). (29)
This corresponds with the date-of-death value of the incremental pre-tax
transfer that materialized in T's estate (compare 25 with 13), on which
tax was paid at rate t (compare 26 with 14), yielding an incremental after-
tax transfer equal to the difference (compare 27 with 15). Since the ex-
pressions +- 1 - - -) and - -l -.M are constant for given values of t, i,
and n, we should expect the foregoing relationships to hold for all values
of X greater than zero and less than the value given by (22).
In other words, in a system in which estates and lifetime gifts are
taxed consistently by taxing estates at rate t, and taxing net lifetime
transfers to private beneficiaries when made at rate I+t , the impact on a
transferor of making a lifetime gift subject to a retained life interest is
that the transferor foregoes (assuming he restricts subsequent consump-
tion to income) the income for life from the amount required to be paid
as tax." The value of the interest foregone by the transferor shows up as
an incremental wealth transfer to his beneficiaries. The incremental
transfer is taxed at rate t. Only the interest foregone,after being taxed at
rate t, is actually available for distribution to the transferor's benefi-
ciaries. Under a system of grossed-up taxation, all transfers are taxed.
Case 3: Lifetime Transfer Taxed Under Present Law;
Gift Tax Taxed at Death
As in Case 2, T makes a lifetime transfer of assets equal to E(1 - t),
retaining an income interest for life. The present value (and the value for
gift tax purposes) of the transferred remainder (6a) is again ED( -
Under the assumptions of Case 3, however, the lifetime gift is taxed at
the nominal transfer tax rate (t), so that the gift tax is
tED (1 - t). (9a)
Since, as in Case 2, the value of the remainder itself has been taxed, the
date-of-death value of the assets in which the remainder was created,
E(1 - t), will be excluded from T's estate, and, also as in Case 2, T's
wealth will have been depleted by payment of the tax. Therefore the
assets in T's estate will consist of his original wealth (E) minus the date-
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of-death value of the assets in which the remainder was created (6) and
tha gift tax (9a), or
E-E(1--t)- tE 1 t)o
1 t2E
tE (1 - D+ -- or
tEtE - E (U - 0). (10a-1)
In Case 3, however, the gift tax itself is not taxed until Ts death,
when it is drawn back into T's estate under an unlimited version of sec-
tion 2035(c). Thus, T's taxable estate also includes the gift tax paid (from
9a), and (adding 9a and lOa-1) equals
tE, (10a-2)
the estate tax on which (at rate t) will be
t2E. (Ila)
The assets in T's estate after tax (10a-1 minus Ila) are
tE LE
tE - (1 - t) - t2E,
which,.rearranged and factored, equals
(I -0 t)E(1 -- ) (12a)
The value, as of T's death, of the total pre-tax wealth transfer, con-
sisting of the sum of the remainder created by lifetime transfer (6a) val-
ued as of death (6), plus the gift tax paid (9a) also valued as of death
(from 1), plus the assets in T's estate (10a-1), equals
E (1 - t) + tE (1 - t) + tE - E (1- t),or
D (1 to
£ + tE (1 - D) - tE (1- -), or
E + (1 - t) tE (I - ) (13a-1)
On the other hand, for tax purposes, the total wealth transferred by
T, valued as of T's death, consists of the lifetime gift valued as of death
(6), plus the taxable estate (10a-2, which includes the amount of the gift
tax paid, valued as of the time the gift was made), or
E (1 - t) + tE, or
E. (13a-2)
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The total taxes paid, valued as of death, consist of the sum of the gift tax
(9a) valued as of death (from 1), plus the estate tax (la), or
tE (1 - t) + t 2E, or
tE. (14a)
The total transfer after tax, valued as of death, which may be derived
either by valuing the remainder created by lifetime transfer as of T's
death (6) and adding it to T's estate after tax (12a), or by subtracting the
date-of-death value of the total taxes paid (14a) from the date-of-death
value of the total pre-tax transfer (13a-1), is
In other words, the date-of-death value of the total pre-tax wealth
transfer, as seen by the transfer tax system (13a-2), and thus the date-of-
death value of the total transfer taxes paid (14a), correspond with the
pre-tax transfer and transfer taxes paid in Case 1 (4 and 5). They are
smaller by t 2E(1 - - ) than the date-of-death value of the pre-tax trans-
fer and transfer taxes paid in Case 2 (compare 13a-1 with 13, and 14a
with 14). But the date-of-death value of the total wealth that actually
passes to private beneficiaries after tax, given by (15a), corresponds with
the date-of-death value of the aggregate wealth transferred after tax in
Case 2 (15). In Case 3, then, as in Case 2, an incremental after-tax trans-
fer has occurred, but in Case 3, in contrast with Case 2, the incremental
transfer went untaxed.
A digression to explain these results is in order. In Case 1, the pre-
sent values of T's life interest (7), the tax on T's estate (5a), and the
amount passing to T's beneficiaries after tax (6a), were E(1 - - ), L, and
E(1 - t), respectively, the sum of which is E. In Case 2, T made a gift
the present value of which was E (1 - t), incurring a gift tax of L (9).
The present value of T's income interest therefore was reduced bytE (1 - -) (16), to (from 9, 16)
1 tE 1E (1 1 -E (1 1
The present value of the interest foregone by T in turn reappeared as an
asset of equivalent value (10, discounted to present value from 1) in his
estate. The present value of the tax on that additional amount (11, dis-
counted to present value), is PE (1 - 1 , leaving an estate after tax having atE
present value (12, discounted to present value) of a - t) (1 - D). These
items-gift, gift tax, life interest, estate tax and estate after tax-have
present values the sum of which is also E.
Essentially the same thing occurs in Case 3, with one difference: the
government foregoes collecting part of the gift tax. Instead of collecting
gift tax of
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D(1 - t) (1 t) = D' (9)
it collects D (,-t) (9a). The left-hand side of (9) may be re-expressed by
transforming 1 '-t into
t2 + t - t
(1 - t) or
t2
(1 - t) + ,
and the gift tax liability in Case 2 can be expressed as
[(1- t) (1 - t) + D(1 - t),or
t2E tED- + D (I -- 0).
The gift tax collected in Case 2 but foregone in Case 3 (9, as restated,
minus 9a) is therefore
t 2E
D
This tax is deferred, not forgiven: the estate tax in Case 3 (11a) of
tE turns out to exceed the estate tax in Case 2 (11) of t'E(z - V" by pre-
cisely the amount of the gift tax "E) foregone. Thus, in undiscounted
terms, the total taxes collected are the same in both cases, namely
t2E + E (1 -
but has been deferred for T's life. T is permitted to retain, and the
government foregoes, an interest for T's life in L, the present value of
which (from 3) is
t2E U 1
b(1- ).
But what the government has foregone also has a value equal to the in-
cremental tax of !- (1 - 1) (11 discounted to present value) imposed on
the incremental transfer with a present value of L a - -1 (10 discounted
to present value) that occurred in Case 2. In other words, although the
government has levied nominally identical transfer taxes in Cases 2 and 3,
in the latter it has deferred imposition of a portion of them for a period
such that the value foregone exactly offsets the tax on the additional
transfer that occurs in both cases.
In Case 3, as in Case 2, the appearance of additional assets in T's
estate (10a-l), even after the lifetime creation of a remainder in
E(1 - t), implies that T originally could have created a remainder sub-
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ject to a retained life interest in some greater amount, E(1 - t) + X. If
T did so, the gift tax value of the remainder (given by 19), when taxed at
the nominal rate (t), would create a gift tax liability of
tE tx(1 - t) + --. (20a)
The assets in T's estate now would consist of his original wealth (E),
minus the assets in which the remainder was created (19), valued as of
death (from 1), and minus the gift tax paid (20a), or
E tXtE - (1 - t) - X - i- (21a-1)
Under section 2035(c) (which is assumed to be in effect), however, T's
estate for tax purposes would also include the gift tax paid on creation of
the remainder (20a), so that the taxable estate would be
tE - X, (21a-2)
the estate tax on which (at rate t) would be
t 2E - tX, (23a)
leaving an estate after tax (21a-1 minus 23a) of
tE tXtE (I - t) - -L- (I - t) - X (I - t) - -t- (24a)
In Case 3, T cannot-at least if he is to be fair about it-increase the
amount of the assets in which the remainder is created so that the sum of
those assets plus the gift tax paid entirely depletes his wealth. The gift
tax will be included in the estate for tax purposes, creating an estate tax
liability.* Thus, to maximize the incremental wealth transfer fairly
through the creation of a remainder by lifetime transfer, the assets in
which the remainder is created should be limited to an amount such that,
after paying gift tax on the creation of the remainder, T will retain (and
leave to his estate) assets sufficient to satisfy the estate tax on the sum of
those assets plus the gift tax included in the estate under section 2035(c).
* To unify the gift and estate taxes by taxing the gift tax at death might; in other
words, create something of an administrative problem. Provision might well have to be
made for individuals not acting "fairly" and making lifetime transfers of remainders subject
to retained life interests in an amount such that their estates were without sufficient assets
to pay tax on the gift tax included in the estate under a version of LR.C. § 2035(c) (1982)
amended to reach all gift taxes paid during the taxpayer's life. Some form of transferee
liability presumably would be the answer. Such an approach theoretically might give rise to
income taxable to the transferor's estate. See Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 197
(1982) (a "donor realizes an immediate economic benefit by the donees assumption of the
donor's legal obligation to pay the gift tax"); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279
U.S. 716, 731 (1929) (employer's payment of income tax assessable against an employee
constitutes additional income to such employee).
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In other words, in Case 2, T maximizes the incremental transfer by reduc-
ing his taxable estate to zero; whereas, in Case 3, he does so by reducing
his estate after tax to zero. Setting (24a) equal to zero yields
t tE t2 E
x (I - t + -)=tE - tE - - + -- and
xD -tD + t) tED- t2 ED + t 2E- tE
DD yed
Factoring the right side and multiplying by D yields
X=tE[ - D - tD + t1
Since this expression is identical with expression 22, the maximum
amount by which T can increase the assets in which a remainder is cre-
ated subject to a retained life interest, while providing for the satisfaction
of transfer tax liabilities, is the same in Case 3 as in Case 2.
Provided that X is greater than zero and less than the value given by
22, the date-of-death value of the total pre-tax wealth transfer, consisting
of the assets in which the remainder (19) was created, valued as of death
(from 1), plus the gift tax (20a) valued as of death (from 1), plus the
assets in T's estate (21a-1), is
tE tXE (1 - t) + X + tE (1 - t) + tX + tE - D (I - t) - X - or
1 1E+tE (1 - t) (1 - D) + tX (a - B). (25a-1)
However, for tax purposes the total wealth transferred by T, valued
as of T's death, consists of the lifetime gift (19) valued as of death (from
1), plus the taxable estate (21a-2), or
E (1 - t) + X + tE - X, or
E. (25a-2)
And the date-of-death value of the total transfer taxes paid, consist-
ing of the gift tax (20a) valued as of death (from 1), plus the estate tax
(23a), is
tE (1 - t) + tX + t2E - tX, or
tE. (26a)
The total transfer after tax, valued as of death, which again may be
derived either by valuing the remainder created by lifetime transfer (19)
as of T's death (from 1) and adding it to Ts estate after tax (24a), or by
subtracting the date-of-death value of the total taxes paid (26a) from the
date-of-death value of the total pre-tax transfer (25a-1), is
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1- tJ[ E + tE (I- +1 t ) (1- (27a)
In other words, for all values of X greater than zero and less than the
value given by expression 22, the total wealth transferred by T will have a
date-of-death value for tax purposes of E (25a-2), equal to the value of
T's estate in Case 1 (4). Consequently, in all such cases T and T's estate
will incur transfer tax liabilities having a date-of-death value of tE (26a),
identical to the estate tax paid in Case 1 (5). Nevertheless, for a given
value of X, the total wealth transferred after tax in Case 3 (27a) will be
identical to the total wealth transferred after tax for the corresponding
value of X in Case 2 (27). In both cases the same change occurs in the
amount of the after-tax wealth transfer. But in Case 3 the value of the
taxes paid does not reflect this change.
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APPENDIX B
Two sets of steps are needed to create a rate schedule to be applied
to the gift tax value of lifetime gifts that will operate to tax gifts in the
same way as the rate table in I.R.C. § 2001(c) taxes estates.
First, a tax-exclusive gift tax rate, t,, must be computed for each
marginal, tax-inclusive estate tax rate, tzl, tE, etc. The resulting gift tax
rates are tElI(1 - tEl), tmI(1 - tE2), etc.
Second, for the amount subject to tax in each estate tax marginal
bracket, BE,, BR, etc., there must be found a corresponding marginal gift
tax bracket, BGI, BG2, etc., such that the width of each such bracket, G1,
G2, etc., plus the tax on the amount taxed in that bracket,
GI[tzl/(1 - tEl)], G2[t/(1 - t.)], etc., equals the width of the corre-
sponding estate tax bracket.
Thus,
B01 - GI: G1 + G1 [t/(1 - ta)] = BE,G 1[1 + tB11(l - tEd)] = Bm
G1 [1/(1 - tEl)] = BE1, and
G = BE, (1 - t5 1) - B 1
Successive creation of gift tax brackets in this fashion gives rise to a
corresponding gift tax rate schedule. As so computed for the estate tax
rate schedule as it will be in effect after 1984, the corresponding gift tax
rate schedule is set out below. Note that, because the existing estate tax
rates were fixed without regard for how readily they would convert into
tax-exclusive gift tax rates, the gift tax rates emerge in decimal fractions.
Such fractions have been rounded to the nearest one-hundredth.
The "tentative tax" referred to in the caption to the table below is
the gift "tentative tax" referred to in I.R.C. § 2502(a)(1). The "tentative
tax," as computed for estate tax purposes under I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1),
would have to be modified to include in the amount with respect to which
the tentative tax is computed, not only the decedent's "adjusted taxable
gifts" and the decedent's taxable estate, but also the gift taxes paid by
the decedent.
RATE SCHEDULE
AMOUNT WITH RESPECT TO
WHICH THE TENTATIVE TAX IS
COMPUTED TENTATIVE TAX
Not over $8,200 21.95% of such amount
Over $8,200 but not over $16,200 $1,800 plus 25% of the excess of
such amount over $8,200
Over $16,200 but not over $31,800 $3,800 plus 28.21% of the excess
of such amount over $16,200
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Over $31,800 but not over $47,000
Over $47,000 but not over $61,800
Over $61,800 but not over $76,200
Over $76,200 but not over
$111,200
Over $111,200 but not over
$179,200
Over $179,200 but not over
$344,200
Over $344,200 but not over
$501,700
Over $501,700 but not over
$654,200
Over $654,200 but not over
$801,700
Over $801,700 but not over
$944,200
Over $944,200 but not over
$1,219,200
Over $1,219,200 but not over
$1,474,200
Over $1,474,200
$8,200 plus $31.58% of the excess
of such amount over $31,800
$13,000 plus 35.14% of the excess
of such amount over $47,000
$18,200 plus 38.89% of the excess
of such amount over $61,800
$23,800 plus 42.86% of the excess
of such amount over $76,200
$38,800 plus 47.06% of the excess
of such amount over $111,200
$70,800 plus 51.52% of the excess
of such amount over $179,200
$155,800 plus 58.73% of the ex-
cess of such amount over $344,200
$248,300 plus 63.93% of the ex-
cess of such amount over $501,700
$345,800 plus 69.49% of the ex-
cess of such amount over $654,200
$448,300 plus 75.44% of the ex-
cess of such amount over $801,700
$555,800 plus 81.82% of the ex-
cess of such amount over $944,200
$780,000 plus 96.08% of the ex-
cess of such amount over
$1,219,200
$1,025,800 plus 100% of the ex-
cess of such amount over
$1,474,200.
